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PRECEDENT AND LEGAL AUTHORITY: A CRITICAL
HISTORY
In this Article, Professor Charles Collier traces out a general theory of prece-
dential authority through historical sources. The Article focuses on three particularly
influential views of precedent: Wambaugh's concept of dictum, Oliphant's concept of
stare decisis, and Goodhart's concept of ratio decidendi. These views illustrate an
underlying tension between two distinct doctrines of precedential authority. The first
doctrine, derived from humanistic thought, restricts-legal authority as narrowly as
possible to the express terms of an original text. The second doctrine draws on the
broad, generalizing tendencies of the empirical sciences and their corresponding con-
ceptions of scientific authority. The two doctrines coexist in a state of essential ten-
sion, because legal principles can become non-precedential either by being too broad
and general or by being too narrow and particularized.
CHARLES W. COLLIER*
Legal discourse could not advance far without an underlying
notion of "legal authority." Such a notion is implied in talk about
authoritative legal texts and opinions, about "holdings" and
"doctrines" of cases, and about the "gravitational force of
precedent"-all of which are comparatively common in current legal
discussions. Yet, the idea of legal authority itself raises basic questions
to which the prevailing answers seem strikingly inadequate. How is it,
for example, that particular legal texts become authoritative in the first
place? What makes a case decided in 1409 "good precedent" for
determining who is liable for leakage from a gas burner installed in
1929?1 Why is a case about contracting for an incestuous marriage
binding on, or even relevant to, the decision in a case of attempted
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A. 1972, Reed College; M.A. 1973,
M.Phil. 1975, Ph.D. 1978, Yale University; J.D. 1985, Stanford Law School.
An earlier version of this Article was presented as a Senior Thesis at Stanford Law School in
1985. I would like to thank Bob Gordon and Tom Grey of Stanford for advising me and guiding
the course of my research on that original project. I am also greatly indebted to Jonathan Culler,
Kermit Hall, Barbara Hauser, Bob Moffat, John Monahan, Walter Probert, Rolf Sartorius,
Frederick Schauer, Chris Slobogin, Sally Jan Smith, Laurens Walker, G. Edward White, James
Boyd White, and Ann Woolhandler for helpful comments, criticisms, advice, and encouragement.
Martha Downey, Paul Healy, Curtis Kinghorn, and Brian Solomon provided valuable research
assistance; the University of Florida Department of History gave me an opportunity to try out
these ideas at a faculty colloquium; and the University of Florida College of Law supported much
of the research on this article with a Summer Research Appointment. '
I. See Bottomley v. Bannister, [19321 1 K.B. 458, 464 & n.l; cf. A. GOODHART,
PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw 29 (1934).
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poisoning?2 How can a series of empirical social science studies be said
to constitute "modem authority" for a judicial decision?3
This Article traces out a general theory of precedent and legal
authority through historical sources. It focuses on a particularly
influential triumvirate of legal Latinisms: dictum, stare decisis, and the
ratio decidendi of a case. These concepts are closely related, and each of
them has had an important interpreter and expositer in modern Anglo-
American legal thought: Wambaugh (dictum); Oliphant (stare decisis);
and Goodhart (ratio decidendi). One purpose in bringing these
concepts and thinkers together is to see whether they shed new light on
each other or add up to more than the sum of their parts. A second
purpose is to document, reconstruct, and "creatively redescribe" this
important chapter in the intellectual history of legal doctrine.4 As
Holmes once remarked, "It is perfectly proper to regard and study the
law simply as a great anthropological document ... as an exercise in the
morphology and transformation of human ideas."5
Sections I, II, and III of the Article are devoted to the three
thinkers and concepts mentioned above. In Section IV, I analyze and
explain the emergence of two, distinctly opposed, doctrines of
precedential authority. The first doctrine is based on the narrow,
deferential reading of original texts that is peculiar to the humanistic
intellectual tradition. The second doctrine draws on the broad,
generalizing tendencies of the natural and social sciences and their
corresponding conceptions of scientific authority. Both doctrines are
necessary to a full understanding of precedential authority because
propositions can become non-precedential either by being too broad
and general or by being too narrow and particularized. Thus, the two
doctrines of precedential authority coexist in a state of "essential
tension," like the thesis and antithesis of a Hegelian dialectic.
I. WAMBAUGH AND THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF DICTUM
The term dictum derives from the Latin dicere, "to say," and refers
in legal usage to anything in a judicial opinion that is "merely" said and
2. See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S.E. 1024 (1889); cf. Arnold, Criminal
Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 53-55 & n.4 (1930) (describing
other citations, "all equally irrelevant," to the incestuous marriage case).
3. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.l (1954); cf. Monahan &
Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U.
PA. L. REv. 477, 483-84 (1986).
4. Accordingly, any evaluative or comparative weighing of the merits of the various
doctrines I describe will be incidental to my purpose. At many points I do, nevertheless, attempt to
make sense of or explain these doctrines, and if an explanation is carried out far enough, it will
often implicitly suggest justifications as well. On the justifications for this type of legal scholarship,
see Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REa. 57 (1984).
5. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 444 (1899).
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not, strictly speaking, meant. That which is "obiter dictum" is stated
only "by the way" to the holding of a case and does not constitute an
essential or integral part of the legal reasoning behind a decision. The
concept of dictum has thus been used to distinguish that which is signifi-
cant, authoritative, binding-in short, meant-in a judicial opinion
from that which is not. As can be seen, the study of dictum necessarily
involves consideration of broad themes in adjudication and legal
interpretation.6
Eugene Wambaugh's Study of Cases7 provides a good initial ori-
entation in the traditional doctrine of dictum. Nominally, it is a kind of
primer for the beginning law student on how to read and interpret re-
ported cases. As Wambaugh notes in his preface, a major aim of the
book is to teach students to "detect dicta" and to determine the perti-
nence and precedential weight of cases.'
To this end an opening chapter is devoted to "finding the doctrine"
of a case, that is, "ascertaining the proposition of law for which a deci-
sion is authority."9 For Wambaugh this inquiry immediately turns in
the direction of exploring common law principles ofjudicial restraint.10
Apparently, by understanding the self-constraints common law judges
consider themselves subject to, we are better able to assess the perti-
nence and weight of opinions written subject to those constraints. By
understanding in general terms what the judges ought to be constrained
by, we understand what they ought to have been constrained by in par-
ticular cases. Whatever individual judges do in particular cases, the true
"doctrine" of their decisions is what survives scrutiny in light of these
general principles of judicial restraint; the unconstrained residue is
dictum.
The first of Wambaugh's four principles ofjudicial restraint is that
"the court making the decision is under a duty to decide the very case
presented and has no authority to decide any other."'" Common law
courts do not render advisory opinions or decide hypothetical cases; 2
and, in the cases they do take, they decide only points upon which the
disposition of the cases depends. 3 "[T]he court's duty is to consider the
6. See generally Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1952).
7. E. WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES (2d ed. 1894) [hereinafter STUDY OF CASES].
8. Id. at vii.
9. Id. at 8.
10. One might well have expected to be convinced first that cases in fact always embody
such propositions and to learn why they do. Wambaugh explains this later.
i1. Id. See also State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455, 459 (1882).
12. U.S. CONST. art. III; Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 8,2 Dall. 409 (1792); Chicago & South-
ern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,
277 U.S. 274 (1928); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); see also FED. R. Civ. PRO. 57; 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
13. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). See also Beckham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 7,91, 152
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
whole case to the extent, and only to the extent, requisite in order to
decide what ... to' do."'" Wambaugh offers three rationales for this
principle of restraint. First, adjudication is an essentially pragmatic or
practical activity aimed at resolving real disputes, "deciding what to
do" about them; the court's duty is "measured by this practical pur-
pose." 5 Viewed from this perspective, deciding unnecessary questions
would be an inefficient use of judicial resources-"to do this would be
to waste strength."' 6 But even if courts had unlimited resources, two
additional reasons would dictate this form of restraint.
Deciding unnecessary questions or taking on moot cases would
threaten the adversary system of proof. This system depends on ad-
versely affected parties to bring their concerns to the court's attention,
to present their own evidence, and to vindicate their view of the law
through full argument. Any other procedure would amount to a pre-
judgment, a binding impairment of the rights of parties who have not
been afforded an "opportunity to be heard."' 7 Finally, the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article III and other separation-of-pow-
ers principles inherent in our state and federal constitutional schemes
dictate that controverted legal questions come before courts only in
their judicial capacity.' 8 For a court to decide in advance a case or
question not before it would be an exercise of legislative power, binding
on other courts before which such cases or questions might properly
arise later. Respect and moral support for the law are weakened where
Eng. Rep. 35, 40 (1841) ("[l]n modern times it has been the usage of judges, not to go out of the
way to decide every point that arises, but to adjudicate only upon the point necessary for the
disposal of the cause."); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 574-76 (1895); State
v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98, 122, 1 N.E. 439, 453-54 (1885).
14. STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 9.
15. Id.; cf. Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1 (1870),
reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 725 (193 1) ("It is the merit of the common law that it decides the
case first and determines the principle afterwards."); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW 100 (1921) ("the function of a judge is not mainly to declare the Law, but to maintain the
peace by deciding controversies").
Of course, courts decide cases, but they also guide people and other courts. Perhaps a focus
on this aspect of judicial decisionmaking would lead to some different conclusions about the na-
ture of precedent. For the necessary corrective, see infra text accompanying notes 215-22.
16. STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 10.
17. Answer of the Justices, 148 Mass. 623, 625, 21 N.E. 439 (1889); see also P. CAR-
RINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. I (2d ed. 1977).
18. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 64-70
(2d ed. 1973). Hart and Wechsler cite the following as factors to be considered: the "sheer...
dispersion of thought" when legal questions are formulated in the abstract, without the aid of a
concrete set of facts (exfactojus oritur); the diminished scope for "the play of personal convic-
tions or preferences" with respect to public policy; the value of having courts function as "organs
of the sober second thought" in appraising actions already taken, rather than as "advisers at the
front line of governmental action"; and the importance of the above factors in ensuring social
acceptability of judicial decisions. Id. at 67. See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
113-17 (1962).
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courts are seen as "constitutional advisers" to other branches of gov-
ernment rather than as neutral, passive adjudicators of private rights.' 9
Wambaugh's second principle is a "minimalist" version of a rule
of decision: The doctrine of a case is "a proposition which strips away
the unessential circumstances and declares a rule as to the essential
ones." 20 All cases are of course, strictly speaking, unique and abso-
lutely distinguishable on their facts. If a court must decide only the ac-
tual case before it and no other, as Wambaugh's first principle requires,
the rule of decision in any given case could apparently apply only where
identical fact situations presented themselves, that is, nowhere else. But
of course the authority of doctrine is not this limited; it applies wher-
ever the differences between cases are unessential. Assuming that we can
decide what is essential and what is not,21 Wambaugh restricts the true
doctrine of a case to the rule without which the essential questions in the
case could not have been decided as they were.22 If a question could
have been decided either way without affecting the outcome of a case,
then "according to the principles of the common law, an opinion on
such a question is not a decision."' 23 The doctrine of a case is the nar-
rowest rule by which the essential circumstances presented in the case
could have been decided and disposed of as they were. This is implicitly
also the rule that judges should follow in deciding cases. They should
articulate and follow the narrowest rule that leads to a correct decision
on the essential facts of the case, and no more. Thus, Wambaugh's sec-
19. J. BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH part I, ch. xxiii (1913); FED. R. EVlD. 103; P.
CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCk, supra note 17, at 406-09.
20. STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 15.
21. For Wambaugh, this assumption appears to be unproblematic; but see Section III(B)
infra, especially text accompanying notes 106-1l; cf. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571,
582-83 (1987). An "unessential" difference is one whose presence or absence would not affect the
determination of the legal principle for which a case is authority. As examples of unessential differ-
ences, Wambaugh gives "a difference as to the persons interested" (unless in one case the party is
an infant, a lunatic, an alien, "or otherwise clothed with extraordinary qualities") and a difference
as to the times of the events upon which the cases are based (unless in one case a statute of limita-
tions, laches, or some similar principle makes the lapse of time important). STUDY OF CASES, supra
note 7, at 14; see also id. at 68-69.
22.
[LJet [the beginner] first frame carefully the supposed proposition of law. Let him then
insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him then inquire whether, if
the court had conceived this new proposition to be good, and had had it in mind, the
decision could have been the same. If the answer be affirmative, then, however excellent
the original proposition may be, the case is not a precedent for that proposition, but if
the answer be negative the case is a precedent for the original proposition and possibly
for other propositions also.
STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 17 (footnote omitted).
23. Carroll v. Carroll's Lessee, 57 U.S. 128, 136, 16 How. 275, 286-87 (1853); cf. Bole v.
Horton, Vaughan 360, 382, 124 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1124 (1673) ("An opinion given in Court, if not
necessary to the judgment given of record, but that it might have been as well given if no such, or a
contrary, opinion had been broach'd is no judicial opinion, nor more than a gratis dictum.").
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ond principle, which starts out looking like a key to discerning the true
doctrine of a case, is actually another rule of judicial restraint. The keys
to proper interpretation are the same as the rules of proper
adjudication.
Wambaugh's third principle is that the words of the court are not
themselves the doctrine of the case and are, therefore, not authority of
the highest order. The actual language of the judges does not have the
force of precedent, but to the extent that it expresses "the proposition
of law necessarily involved in the decision" it is not dictum either.24 It
lies somewhere in between. The doctrine of the case may be expressed
by none of the court's language, as when an order issues without an
opinion. It may even be wrongly expressed by the court. Be that as it
may, the essential propositions from which the case derives its prece-
dential force can, Wambaugh asserts, be discovered by anyone who
"diligently studies the problem and the result."2
Wambaugh appears to be groping here toward a kind of Platonic
dualism of the doctrine and the language expressing it. The doctrine of
the case is an idea, a reason, an intellectual proposition.26 It may be
expressed more or less appropriately in the words of the court, but it is
never exhausted or perfectly captured in any actual formulations.
Wambaugh compares the case, which comprises the problem submitted
to the court and the result eventually reached, to an artificial person
whose essence consists in uttering a proposition of law. "[I]t is the
court's duty to hear this proposition and to embody it in words."27 But
again, these words derive their precedential value not from the fact that
they have actually been pronounced by judges, but from the fact that
they express, however imperfectly, the doctrine necessarily involved in
the decision. They are approximations to the ideal.2 8
24. See STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 18-20.
25. Id. at 22; see also Dubuque v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 39 Iowa 56, 79-80 (1874).
26. Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr. 1363, 1364,97 Eng. Rep. 876 (1762) ("The reason and spirit
of cases make law; not the letter of particular precedents."); Cage v. Acton, 12 Mod. 288, 294, 88
Eng. Rep. 1327, 1331 (1699) ("[T]he reason of a resolution judgment] is more to be considered
than the resolution itself.").
27. STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 21.
28. Wambaugh gives the Platonic example of a musician's reduction of a bird's tune to
musical notation: "To the extent to which the notation is accurate, it is not the musician's compo-
sition, but is the bird's own song; and to the extent to which the notation is inaccurate, it is not the
bird's song, but is a more or less original and pleasing composition by the musician." Id. at 22-23.
For articulations of the view, pace Dworkin and numerous others, that it may be a mistake
to treat rules and their formulations as different in any interesting sense and that rules-including
the rules we construct from materials we take to be precedentially authoritative-may in an impor-
tant sense reside in rather than behind their formulations, see Schauer, Book Review, 85 MicH. L.
Rv. 847 (1987) (reviewing R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J.
509 (1988).
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According to Wambaugh, judges have no special priority in deter-
mining the propositions for which their decisions shall be precedent.2 9
Judges are like artists whose works, once released to the general public,
mean what the cultured learning of the day says they do.30 The work of
judges is the decision, not the opinion. They may try to explain their
work in an opinion, but they need not-and even if they do, they may
get it wrong. In principle, anyone who thinks long enough, hard
enough, and reasonably enough about a case can determine the propo-
sition of law necessary to the decision, though this may be expressed in
any number of ways. Thus, whatever courts may say, they cannot make
an unnecessary proposition the doctrine of a case.
In his fourth principle Wambaugh offers a kind of corrective to the
third, which might be taken to imply that judges' opinions can safely be
ignored. No, says Wambaugh, a case is not a precedent for any proposi-
tion that was not in the mind of the court. It is possible that a correct
judgment could be arrived at for the wrong reasons, but is it likely?
Ascribing infallibility to a judge's decisions while at the same time dis-
crediting his powers of reasoning is an "undignified piece of perverse-
ness. Surely the judgment and the reasons for it are too intimately con-
nected to allow of such distinctions; they must stand or fall
together .... -31 We cannot assume that a decree from the bench is like
the enchanted bullet in Der Freischutz, which always hits its mark even
when the gun is pointed in the opposite direction. Instead, we demand
that the judicial work-product be the result of considered deliberation.
"What makes decisions of value as precedents is the fact that they are
based upon reasoning and not upon chance .... Otherwise decisions
could not be ... reduced to a scientific system .... 32 Such an assump-
tion probably underlies any practical activity thought of as a rational
enterprise.
Where deliberation is completely lacking, a case is of no authority
for any proposition whatever. The same applies on a smaller scale to
issues or questions not considered by the court; the decision says noth-
29. See STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 23; cf. R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGUSH LAW
42 (3d ed. 1977) ("it is trite learning that the interpreter has nearly as much to say as the speaker so
far as the meaning of words is concerned").
30. See Letter from George Santayana to Charles G. Spiegler, quoted in Spiegler,
Santayana Might Have Flunked the Exam, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, at E14, col. 3, 4 (national ed.)
(letter to the editor):
The sonnet.., was written 55 years ago, and I should hardly trust myself to say
now exactly what interpretation, if any, might exactly correspond to what may have been
in my mind when I wrote it....
When once anything is given to the public it belongs to the public and they are at
liberty to find in it what meaning they choose.
31. STUDY oF CASES, supra note 7, at 25 n.2 (quoting The Reporting System, 7 LAW Ray.
223, 227-28 (1848)).
32. STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 25, 24.
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ing about them. A judgment entered without an opinion can stand for
something, if we have reason to think it was duly considered by the
court; but unless there is an opinion "there cannot be a very useful or
weighty precedent." 33 And what about wrong but thoughtfully consid-
ered opinions supporting correct decisions? If Wambaugh were true to
his "Platonism," he would insist that such a decision affirmed some-
thing true even if no one were insightful enough to understand it or
express it.34 Conversely, the misunderstood or misexplained idea-the
wrongheaded opinion-is not an intellectual advance. Wambaugh does
not say this, however. The wrongheaded opinion misexplaining a case is
"a precedent, though often not a strong one, for the proposition really
necessary.",35 The goal of adjudication is to dispose of social problems
in socially acceptable ways, not to discover eternal truth. The imperfect
product of a conscientious judge is still a useful contribution to the es-
sentially pragmatic, practical activity of adjudication. Opinions do not
lack precedential value because judges are wanting in wisdom or in-
sight; rather, they lack it when judges have not fully deliberated, be-
stowed "sufficient thought" on an issue, or "solemnly decided" a ques-
tion with full argument at the bar. 6 When Wambaugh says that "what
makes decisions of value as precedents is the fact that they are based
upon reasoning and not upon chance," by "reasoning" he does not
mean any specialized scientific training or philosophical insight; he
means reasoning that is subject to the safeguards of the legal process.
In the remainder of his book, Wambaugh elaborates a conception
of dicta as judicial pronouncements upon which sufficient thought has
not been bestowed. This can occur when a general principle applicable
to the decision of one case is brought to bear on other cases to which it
is inapplicable. In Cohens v. Virginia, for example, Chief Justice
Marshall, in a rare admission of error, explains the inapplicability of his
own opinion in Marbury v. Madison as follows:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expres-
sions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the
case in which those expressions are used .... The reason of
this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court
33. Id. at 23 n.2; see also id. at 47 ("If the reasons for a decision are not given, the
decision can be of little weight, for it does not appear to have been the result of thorough investiga-
tion."); cf. J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 39-40 (1986) ("Of course any
analyst pays attention to what a speaker did after speaking, but only as an aid in determining what
the speaker meant. What a judge did is evidence only, not the object of investigation.") (emphasis
in original).
34. The form of justice, to take a Platonic example, is every bit as real even when no one
is trying to discover or understand it; the idea is true even though no one happens to be thinking it.
35. STUDY OF CAsES, supra note 7, at 23.
36. Id. at 19, 23 n.2.
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is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are consid-
ered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible
bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.37
Marbury v. Madison proceeded upon the principle that an affirmative
grant of one sort of jurisdiction must negate any other sort of jurisdic-
tion, if otherwise the relevant constitutional clause would be totally in-
operative. "Having such cases only in its view," acknowledges Chief
Justice Marshall in Cohens, "the [Marbury] court lays down a principle
which is generally correct, in terms much broader than the decision,
and not only much broader than the reasoning with which that decision
is supported, but in some instances contradictory to its principle."3 In
relation to the fact situation of Cohens, the Marbury principle was dic-
tum. The Marbury Court either had not sufficiently thought through
the general principle to foresee the circumstances presented in Cohens
or had intended that the principle, however general in the abstract, be
understood and interpreted only in relation to circumstances such as
were presented in Marbury. In either case, the authority of the principle
is, to paraphrase Wambaugh, roughly proportional to the amount of
.thought bestowed on it by the court in relation to the situation to which
it would be applied.
Another way that less thought can be bestowed on a question is for
the judge or tribunal to be inherently less thoughtful. Conversely, the
opinions of more learned and esteemed judges carry more weight and
have more authority as precedents because more thought has been in-
37. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 82, 97-98, 6 Wheat. 264, 399-400 (1821); cf. Quinn v.
Leathem, [1901] App. Cas. 495, 506:
... [E]very judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or
assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there
are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the
particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.
See also State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566, 572-73 (1867) ("The reason assigned for their [dicta's] not
being entitled to weight is that usually they are upon some point not discussed at bar .... ");
Railroad Cos. v. Schutte, 103 U.S. 118, 143 (1880) ("It cannot be said that a case is not authority
on one point because, although that point was properly presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the cause, something else was found in the end which disposed of the
whole matter. Here the precise question was properly presented, fully argued, and elaborately
considered in the opinion.").
38. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 98, 6 Wheat. at 401. Chief Justice Marshall concedes that in
Marbury "some expressions are used which go far beyond" the reasoning of the Court in support
of that decision (id. at 98, 6 Wheat. at 400) but adds that "[t]he general expressions in the case of
Marbury v. Madison must be understood with the limitations which are given to them in this
opinion; limitations which in no degree affect the decision in that case, or the tenor of its reason-
ing." Id. at 99, 6 Wheat. at 401-02.
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vested in them. 9 Wambaugh notes, for example, that great weight is
attached to any opinion delivered by Coke, Hale, Holt, Lord Mans-
field, Baron Parke, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Marshall, Justice
Story, Chief Justice Shaw, or Chief Justice Gibson.4 ° The same applies
to certain courts. At various times in our history the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, the New York Court of Appeals, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court have enjoyed
unquestioned preeminence, at least in certain fields of law. Even the
dicta of these esteemed judges and courts take on considerable author-
ity, especially when they are strengthened through frequent citation and
approval.41 As noted above, an uncritical reliance on dicta would vio-
late accepted principles of judicial restraint and the separation of pow-
ers. Yet to give no weight at all to the dicta and non-judicial utterances
of learned jurists would be to ignore aids that in any other field of in-
quiry would seem well worth investigation. 42 After all, as Justice Sa-
muel F. Miller remarked, "the convincing power of the opinion or deci-
sion in a reported case must depend very largely on the force of the
reasoning by which it is supported, and of this every lawyer and every
court must of necessity be his and its own judge."' 43 One must simply
recall the inherent limitations on the precedential value of dicta and
keep in mind that even the most esteemed jurists make ill-conceived
pronouncements every so often.
In general, learned judges or courts necessitate an important quali-
fication of Wambaugh's principles by which dicta are to be discounted.
When he discusses the safeguards of the legal process-the adversary
39.
The weight given to dicta and the like is dependent largely upon the learning and reputa-
tion of the utterer. Some old text-books have very great weight; and so have the dicta of
some famous judges .... [I]n this sense a dictum is authority, its weight varying with the
learning of the court and with the amount of thought bestowed by the court upon the
point covered by the dictum.
STUDY OF CASEs, supra note 7, at 103, 19 (footnotes omitted).
40. See id. at 63 n. 1. Similarly, Justice Samuel F. Miller cites in this regard the names of
Marshall, Taney, Kent, and Shaw. "Even the dissenting opinions of these men and their obiter
dicta have weight in the minds of lawyers who have a just estimate of their character, which they
cannot give to many courts of last resort of acknowledged ability." J. DILLON, THE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AmERiCA 263 (1895).
41. See STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 66.
42. See id. at 103 ("Any lawyer in search ofa solution for an intricate problem is glad to
know what view, however hasty, is taken by any other person learned in the law; and when the
lawyer goes upon the bench he does not lose his spirit of inquiry.").
43. Letter from Samuel F. Miller to John F. Dillon (Nov. 16, 1885) (quoted in J. DIL-
LON, supra note 40, at 263); cf. Adams Export Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 352, 126 N.E.
300, 301 (1919):
A decided case is worth as much as it weighs in reason and righteousness, and no
more. It is not enough to say "thus saith the court." It must prove its right to control in
any given situation by the degree in which it supports the rights of a party violated and
serves the cause of justice as to all parties concerned.
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system, judicial restraint, separation of powers-Wambaugh's empha-
sis is on the quantity of thought, on the opportunities for thoughtful-
ness. But when he discusses the authority of the learned judge or tribu-
nal his emphasis is on the quality of thought. Both factors are
important. This point is summarized well in the revised and condensed
version of Wambaugh's work:
It is true that, as [dicta] are not required as steps toward the
decision of the very case, they may have been uttered without
full argument from counsel and without full consideration
from the court; but if they can be shown to have been consid-
ered carefully, or to have been pronounced by unusually skill-
ful judges, already well acquainted with the subject, no lawyer
denies that they are of consequence.44
II. OLIPHANT'S "RETURN" TO STARE DECISIS
A notable reaction to what has been termed the "traditional" doc-
trine of Wambaugh set in during the 1920s and 1930s. The legal realist
44. E. WAMBAUGH, How to Use Decisions and Statutes, in BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF
LAW BooKs Ill (R. Cooley ed. 1909); see also id. at 121 ("In discussing dicta, it probably became
clear that their lack of great weight-even their occasional lack of great persuasive authority-
although due theoretically to their somewhat extrajudicial character, is also justified from a purely
practical point of view by the customary absence of careful deliberation in uttering them.").
Henry Campbell Black's Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws ap-
peared in 1896, just two years after Wambaugh's work. Most of Black's analysis covers the same
ground as and is closely compatible with Wambaugh's. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADrION 73 n.56 (1960). But there are a few important differences. In his chapter on dicta, Black
states that:
The reason usually assigned for not conceding to dicta the weight and effect of
precedents is that they are expressions of opinion upon some matter which may not have
been argued at the bar, or duly brought to the attention of the court, or that they do not
embody the mature and deliberate opinion of the judges. But this is not the true ground.
The test is whether the statement made was necessary or unnecessary to the determina-
tion of the issues raised by the record and considered by the court.... [A] statement of
law makes a precedent; not because it emanates from a wise and learned man, but be-
cause it is laid down by a judge, in his office ofjudge, and speaking to a question brought
before him as a judge.
H.C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 397 (1896). In
a later revised and expanded version of his book, Black added to this explanation the following
sentence: "And although a point may not have been fully argued, yet the decision of the court
thereon cannot be considered a dictum, when the question was directly involved in the issues of
law raised by the record, and the mind of the court was directly drawn to, and expressed upon, the
subject." H.C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON TE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 173 (1912). This proves
only that lack of full argument and deliberation are not sufficient conditions for dictum, not that
they are not necessary conditions. Here Black clearly takes issue with Wambaugh, for whom both
kinds of factors are limitations on the authority of dicta. They are logically and causally insepara-
ble because they are both forms of judicial pronouncements upon which insufficient thought has
been bestowed. As noted previously, the reason that statements "unnecessary to the determination
of the issues raised by the record and considered by the court" do not have the full weight of
precedents is that "[t]he question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered
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and other critiques suggest a return to "even more traditional" concep-
tions of legal authority. Herman Oliphant's important 1927 Presiden-
tial Address to the Association of American Law Schools is a primary
example of this shift in thought. Entitled A Return to Stare Decisis,45 it
traces a profound malaise in Anglo-American jurisprudence and legal
scholarship back to developments in the late nineteenth century.
A. Oliphant's Historically Based Critique of Over-Generalization
The realists are usually thought of as progressive innovators rather
than conservative antiquarians. It therefore requires some analysis to
see why their theory of stare decisis is aligned with the jurisprudence of
an earlier time. Oliphant's essay includes an historical sketch that helps
explain the connection.
in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to
the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated."
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 82, 97-98, 6 Wheat. 264, 399-400 (1821); see supra text accompanying
notes 37-38.
Furthermore, Black's own pronouncements on this subject are not entirely consistent. He
says, as quoted above, that a statement of law does not make a precedent because it emanates from
a wise and learned man. Later, however, when discussing the varying force of precedents, he as-
serts that "aside from the relative rank of the court, much may depend upon its reputation for
learning, consistency, and sound judgment." In that same discussion Black also remarks that
"[t]he opinion in a case gains in weight and authority, and hence in importance as a precedent, in
proportion as the point was the more fully discussed, more completely considered and compre-
hended by the court, and more elaborately elucidated in its judgment." And, finally, he notes that a
decision made upon an ex parte application or in an uncontested suit carries less precedential force
than one in a contested suit, since in the latter case "the points involved in the case are thoroughly
brought into prominence and before the mind of the court, the questions implicated in the case are
argued and discussed, and the judgment of the court is enlightened and its decision influenced by
the exhaustive examination of both sides of the case and by the reference to pertinent authori-
ties ..." H.C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 392-
93, 415, 414-15 (1896).
Of course, these are the very factors that Black singled out in his earlier discussion, when he
denied that they explained the lessened precedential value of dicta. On balance, then, Wambaugh's
view seems sounder: The judicial thought invested in an opinion or decision is the measure of its
precedential force, and the quantity and quality of that thought are interchangeable, each convert-
ible into the other. Cf. 1 G.W.F. HEGEL, WISSENSCtAFr DER LOGIK 168-70, 177 (G. Lasson ed.
1923).
45. 1927 A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS 61, reprinted in Oliphant, A Return to
Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 (1928) (subsequent references are to the A.B.A. J. version
[hereinafter A Return to Stare Decisis]).
The phrase stare decisis derives from the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, "to
stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters." On the origins of the doctrine, see M.
RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 355 (1936); C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE
MAKING 147 (1927). For bibliographies on the extensive literature, see STARE DECISIS AND Tm
DOCTRINE OF LEGAL PRECEDENT: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (J. Mubarak & R. Rich eds., Asa V.
Call Law Library Bibliography Series No. 83, 1978); J.G. WETTER, THE STYLES OF APPELLATE
JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A CASE STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 359-92 (1960) (Bibliography); J. STONE,
LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 368-90 (1964) (Bibliographical Index); Goodhart, Case
Law in England and America, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173, 181 n.40 (1930).
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Early English law had two characteristics that are especially signif-
icant from Oliphant's perspective: Life was simpler, and the legal forms
were more complicated. Life was simpler in two ways. Legal problems
were less numerous and complex and judges were closer to and more
familiar with the phases of human life they regulated. The legal forms
were more complicated because in earlier English law the writs and
forms of pleading were more numerous and more specific than they
now are.46 Then too, in earlier times these legal forms were of relatively
recent origin. Their legal contents fit them with less forcing, because the
forms had not yet become antiquated, alien, and artificial.47
When a judge ascertained and enunciated the "doctrine of a case"
in earlier times, he was able to do so in a way that was relatively specific
and definite. The writs and pleadings directed legal attention to nar-
rowly but accurately compartmentalized sectors of life. Legal princi-
ples, even when stated too broadly, related, and were applied, only to
these comparatively specific fact situations.48 The abstractions and
generalizations used in articulating the doctrine of a case were therefore
relatively narrow. F.W. Maitland, describing the fourteenth century
scheme of writs, even says that "[t]here has been [up to that time] no
generalization; the imaginary defendant is charged in different prece-
dents with every kind of unlawful force, with the breach of every imagi-
nable boundary, with the asportation of all that is asportable. . .. "I'
More recently, however, life has become more complicated, and
the legal forms have become simpler, thus reversing their beneficent re-
lationship of earlier times. The number of actions has been greatly re-
duced, and those remaining have been extended to cover "a flood of
wholly new situations." Similarly, many of the old pleas have been
abandoned, and others have been broadened. This "dulling [of] the
tools for producing the discrimination necessary for intimacy of treat-
ment" at the same time legal problems were becoming rapidly more
complex "is the over-towering fact in Anglo-American legal history of
46. "The old actions divided and minutely subdivided the transaction of life for legal
treatment .... In earlier law there was a wealth of well differentiated pleas." A Return to Stare
Decisis, supra note 45, at 73.
47. Oliphant observes in this connection that things have changed more in the past two
hundred years than in the previous two thousand years. See id. at 74. Those in the field of law are,
he says, "far from having finished drawing all the implications of [that] fact ... "Id. Some of the
more obvious recent developments are the rise in commerce, increasing urbanization, and the
Industrial Revolution. But see Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15 CORNELL L.Q.
173, 185 (1930) ("[Oliphant's] plea resembles Rousseau's demand for a return to the law of na-
ture-a law of nature which never existed except in the author's imagination").
48. A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 74.
49. Maitland, The History of the Register of Original Writs, 3 HARv. L. REv. 212, 225
(1889) (citing as examples the well known writs against the shoeing smith who lames the horse, the
hirer who rides the horse to death, and so forth).
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recent centuries." 50 As a result, when judges now ascertain and enunci-
ate the doctrine of a case, they are forced to use relatively older,
broader, and more tenuous abstractions and generalizations to classify
legal problems that, at the same time, are becoming ever more numer-
ous and complex.5 1
Oliphant's historical analysis does not, however, fully explain why
he deplores the current state of jurisprudence and legal scholarship. Oli-
phant bases his normative analysis on three principles. First, and most
generally, adjudication and legal scholarship have, through reliance on
increasingly general classifications of legal problems, become detached
and remote from everyday life. Courts regulate life with a steadily de-
creasing feeling for its realities. 52 "[O]ur scholarship becomes loose and
unreal.... [N]o alert sense of actuality checks our reveries in theory." 53
Law purports to be an applied, empirical science, says Oliphant, but in
its recent developments it "approximates the unearthly perfection of
pure reason." 54
Second, some of the valuable policy rationales for a more empiri-
cally based jurisprudence have fallen to the wayside. The earlier adher-
ents to stare decisis exhibited "[tlhe grace to drudge away on today's
problem and the refusal to foreclose tomorrow's issues."55 These jurists
of an earlier time were "patient particularists" who "unalterabl[y]
refus[ed] to indulge in broad speculation" and kept their attention
"pinned to the immediate problem" in order that to its solution might
be brought "the illumination which only immediacy affords and the
judiciousness which reality alone can induce." Their version of stare
decisis "leads us forward over untried ground, a step at a time, no step
being taken until it is judged wise, and the stages of its advance are so
short that the direction of march can be quickly shifted as experience
dictates.",56 In other words, these earlier jurists were careful observers
of judicial restraint, separation of powers, standing, and "case or con-
troversy" requirements. Oliphant's policy rationales remain essentially
50. A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 74.
51. "While the law was thus grouping the transactions of life into larger and larger piles,
held together by common attributes more and more accidental, life rolled on, always concrete,
always specific, but becoming more and more diversified with ominous speed." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 76.
54. Id. ("The products of a legal science which neglects its empirical branch share some
of the futility of the findings of a cloistered biologist whose mind ponders only such specimens as
his cat may chance to bring in.").
55. Id. at 75.
56. Id.
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within the conceptual framework of Wambaugh, though the relevant
cultural context is now Her Majesty's Foreign Service.57
The final and most important principle of Oliphant's critique is
that more attention should be focused on judicial decisions than on
judicial opinions. We are in danger of turning stare decisis into "stare
dictis," he says. Instead of concentrating on the exact holdings and ac-
tual dispositions of cases, our jurists "follow" only vague judicial pro-
nouncements and generalized principles. Only when a case appears to
fall near an important doctrinal boundary is any attention focused on
its holding-and then only to place it on one side or the other of "the
rim of some favorite theory whose precise border we want to mark
out."" 8 No one, except Oliphant it seems, is interested in re-examining
the holdings of cases lying squarely at the center of accepted doctrines
or theories; but only in this way can the general utility of those doc-
trines and theories be tested.
Here Oliphant genuinely parts ways with Wambaugh and the ear-
lier tradition, for which accepting a judge's decision while discrediting
his reasons was an "undignified piece of perverseness." 59 Oliphant's
emphasis on what judges do, as opposed to what they say, largely re-
flects a new conception, common to the legal realists, of what it means
to be "scientific." 6 Oliphant assumes, without argument, that "our
main business as legal scientists is to predict the behavior of courts in
deciding future cases."61 Legal doctrine is not an item of observable
behavior or a datum of experience.62 Its natural realm is the world of
ideas, and it manifests itself in'the real world only indirectly, through
the medium of intellectual interpretation and comprehension. The
strand of causality running in that direction is at best ambiguous and
hard to follow; it may even be interrupted or broken by willful misinter-
pretation. 63 Far better, say the empirical-minded realists, to focus on
57. Oliphant also attributes to this spirit the development of the British Empire and the
English Constitution. See id. at 75-76. At that level of generality, who is to say that he has not
keenly and penetratingly observed something?
58. Id. at 76, 107.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
60. This issue will be discussed more thoroughly later, in connection with the theories of
Pollock and Goodhart. See infra Sections II(B) and III.
61. A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 76.
62. See id. at 159 n.5 ("The thesis is that facts are the only stimuli capable of scientific
study as a basis of prediction. Prior rationalizations are rejected for this purpose because the facts
prevail when they diverge from the prior generalizations and for each rationalization indicating
one result, a contradictory one indicating the opposite result can usually be found.") (emphasis in
original).
63. See id. at 160 ("IThe choice between the legal principles competing to control the
new human situations involved in the cases we pass upon is not dictated by logic. Neither deduc-
tion nor induction can do more than suggest the competing analogies and to indicate promising
directions for trial and error testing. Neither the astuteness of legal scholarship nor the authority
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non-vocal judicial behavior that can actually be observed, on judicial
action. After all, every case always presents, in addition to whatever
interesting theoretical problems may be there, a purely practical prob-
lem: what to do with the case, how to dispose of it." The tools of legal
doctrine are simply too clumsy and indirect to help us predict the prac-
tical activity of judges with any accuracy.
This reasoning becomes even more urgent when, as Oliphant
maintains, what judges say is becoming more abstract and general than
it used to be. The doctrine of stare decisis does not tell us in as many
words just what it is in prior decisions that is to be followed.6 5 After
running through the usual arguments to show that the mere action in a
case cannot have significance as a precedent (for no two cases are ever
identical in that limited respect), Oliphant comes up with the interesting
proposition that the holding of a case must be "a proposition of law
covering . . . the fact situation of the instant case and at least one
other."66 That minimum of abstraction or generalization is necessary if
the common law system of precedent is to work at all. It makes sense
that if one decision is to serve as a precedent for another, then they must
have something in common, even if they share it with no other cases.
But in the other direction there opens up a "bad infinite" of gradations
of generalization that seems to have no natural or principled limit. Not
only does the subject area of a case admit of innumerable gradations of
generalization,67 but any case can be analyzed into an almost indefinite
number of subject areas, each with its own innumerable and im-
perceptible gradations of generality. Oliphant uses the analogy of a
spectator entering an empty stadium (to view a precedent, as it were).
The spectator has a choice not only of where around the field to sit
(angle of view, or legal subject area), but also of how far up the rows of
bleachers to go (level of generalization). No internal logic dictates a
resting place in either dimension.
of judicial position can transcend these limitations inherent in logic."); see also H. BLOOM, A MAP
OF MISREADING (1975).
64. Wambaugh recognized that too, but he thought that anyone who considered long
enough and hard enough the problem submitted to a court and the result eventually reached,
could determine the proposition of law necessary to the decision. By contrast, Oliphant has less
confidence in the unaided powers of pure reason, and more confidence in the evidence of experi-
ence. He lives in a world in which judges decide cases involving promises not to compete according
to whether union contracts or business purchases are involved. See A Return to Stare Decisis,
supra note 45, at 159. See also Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11
A.B.A. J. 357 (1925).
65. See A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 72.
66. Id.
67. Oliphant gives the example of a father inducing his daughter to break a promise to
marry and suggests six types of holdings, ranging from "1. Fathers are privileged to induce daugh-
ters to break promises to marry" to "6. All persons are so privileged as to all promises made by
anyone." Id. at 72-73.
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Where on that gradation of propositions are we to take
our stand and say "This proposition is the decision of this
case within the meaning of the doctrine of stare decisis?" Can
a proposition of law... ever become so broad that, as to any
of the cases it would cover, it is mere dictum?6"
Ultimately, Oliphant does not answer this question-he admits as
much in the opening pages of his essay6 9 -but it is instructive to com-
pare his efforts to do so with those of an influential predecessor, Pol-
lock, and an important contemporary, Goodhart. All three suggest an-
swers in their emphasis on method.
B. Pollock's Paradigm of Legal Method
Sir Frederick Pollock entitles his best known essay on legal method
The Science of Case-Law and complains in his first paragraph that "not
much attention has been paid to the scientific character of the methods"
by which English case law has actually been built up, administered, and
developed.7 ° Acting on his belief that "English case-law may fairly
claim kindred with the inductive sciences," 71 Pollock provides a gen-
eral paradigm of legal method based on inductive science.
If law is like other inductive sciences, its ultimate object will be to
predict future events-in this case, the decisions of courts of justice. In
order for these legal events to be predictable, an all-embracing, funda-
mental assumption is needed, one that corresponds to the assumption
in the natural sciences that nature is uniform and that whenever the
same conditions are repeated they will give rise to the same result. Simi-
larly, in order to predict legal results, we must assume that the same
facts give rise to the same decision.72 In other words, judges' decisions
are assumed not to be arbitrary.73 This assumption is conventional in
the sense that it is under human control. Things might well have been
otherwise, unlike with nature, which just is uniform. But as it is, one of
68. Id. at 73.
69. See id.
70. F. POLLOCK, The Science of Case-Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 237
(1882), reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS 169 (A.L. Goodhart ed. 1961) (subsequent
references are to the Goodhart edition [hereinafter The Science of Case-Law]).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 170-71.
73. See id. at 178. For Wambaugh, "[w]hat makes decisions of value as precedents is the
fact that they are based on reasoning and not upon chance.... Otherwise decisions ... would be
arbitrary or accidental, and could not be reduced to a scientific system.... STUDY OF CASES, supra
note 7, at 24-25. Nevertheless, this translates into a weaker form of predictability than that as-
sumed by Pollock. The reasoning process cannot be supposed to give rise to the same results
whenever the same "conditions" obtain. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64; see also F.
LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HEaME, uncs 9-10 (W. Hammond ed. 1880) (interpretation is not
arbitrary).
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the chief aims of the judicial system-and of essays like Pollock's-is to
make law uniform and legal decisions capable of prediction.74 Of
course, they are only approximately and imperfectly so. Nevertheless, a
uniformity that is known to be relative and approximate may still be of
great practical value.7 5
One of the most important aids for ensuring uniformity in com-
mon law adjudication is the understanding that courts follow the au-
thority of decisions formerly given on similar facts. For systematic uni-
formity, it is helpful to have one (and preferably only one) court of last
resort, whose decisions are binding on all lower courts and on itself. A
final necessary ingredient is a system of reports; like the natural scien-
tist, the legal scientist can predict the future only on the basis of detailed
and carefully recorded observations of the past.
After these somewhat formal institutional assumptions have been
granted, Pollock's further elaboration of scientific legal method is
harder to describe in precise terms. He says that, in making predictions
of legal decisions, the jurist first sifts through the facts of the case to
separate out the most material ones, next makes a provisional determi-
nation as to what area of law is involved, and then seeks out the general
rule of law that governs those facts. Still, Pollock advises only that
•.. [t]he success of these operations depends on the manner in
which the work of selection and comparison is performed in
each case .... [I]n other words, [the inquirer] must select the
right kind of cases for comparison with the case before him.
And... he must observe the right points of likeness and un-
likeness in the cases he compares. Failure in any one of these
things may lead him to a wrong conclusion.76
If this "method" sounds a little like "Don't make mistakes," it is be-
cause these operations cannot be reduced to a rule (at least not to any
rule yet known). Rather, they draw upon the "unconscious habits" of
experts, whose ways of "looking at the matters of their own art in the
right way... may almost be called an instinct."77
74. See The Science of Case-Law, supra note 70, at 180.
75. Id. at 179 ("We work with an assumed rule which we know not to be exactly true, but
which we find near enough to the truth for the purpose in hand.").
76. Id. at 177.
77. Id. Compare with this conclusion of Pollock the concept of judicial "intuition" de-
veloped by Oliphant, who says that "immediate experience in contemporary life,--the battered
experiences of judges among brutal facts" and "[t]he response of their intuition of experience to
the stimulus of human situations is the subject-matter having that constancy and objectivity neces-
sary for truly scientific study." A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 159. Oliphant places
reliance on the fact the "j]udges are men and men respond to human situations" in reliable ways
that are susceptible of sound and satisfying scientific study. "That ancient empiricism was intui-
tive. It worked well because judges sat close to problems and viewed them as current problems. It
would have worked better still had it been conscious and methodical." Id. at 160.
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Resting a paradigm of inductive legal science on "instinct" is, of
course, something of an anomaly. Yet even if Pollock's scheme is ulti-
mately unsatisfactory, some of the details are interesting, especially
those that concern the status of general rules of law. When a general
principle is familiar and settled law, then the original authorities for it
need not be discussed at great length. But if a rule is not so well estab-
lished, or not obviously applicable to the case at hand,
•.. a sound lawyer... will attend as little as possible to the
form in which the general proposition is expressed, but will
proceed to study the particular cases from which it is col-
lected, examining their points of likeness and unlikeness to the
case before him... [and] consider the legal results of the vari-
ous sets of facts already decided upon in the reported
78
cases ....
This is so because good lawyers acknowledge that case law is at
best an inexact "science." As Aristotle remarks in his Ethics, one mark
of an educated man is to know the degree of precision possible in his
discipline, and not to expect more. 7 Good lawyers recognize that legal
predictions are rough and approximate and that care must be taken not
to formulate general principles as if they were based on anything more
than the actual results of particular cases. Induction proceeds from par-
ticulars to particulars. Even when jurists purport to deduce their deci-
sions from general propositions, Pollock says they really have in mind
not so much the general propositions as the decided cases in which
those propositions are justified."0 The inductive method, properly con-
ceived, is an ideal safeguard against dictum: "Lawyers fully recognise
that it is unsafe to rely on a general statement of law, however solemnly
adopted by the court, which is 'not necessary to the decision'. In other
words, they admit the inductive method alone as valid."'"
Pollock's position thus ends up as a kind of legal nominalism.
General rules of law may have a useful "symbolic" or heuristic function
as shorthand references to specific bodies of decisional authority. They
are, however, "only misleading if they are supposed to mean anything
else." 2 This is a sterner and more positivistic or empirical doctrine
Pollock, by contrast, cautions that "judges and lawyers are human, and their legal judgment
is sometimes influenced by unscientific motives." The Science of Case-Law, supra note 70, at 181.
In other words, it is precisely the human, intuitive element that is unscientific. A "science of intui-
tion" would be an oxymoron for Pollock.
78. The Science of Case-Law, supra note 70, at 176-77.
79. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETmcs, Bk. I, ch. 3; cf. Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and
Value-Judgments, 10 TEX. L. Rv. 127, 130-32 (1932).
80. See The Science of Case-Law, supra note 70, at 182.
81. Id.
82. Id.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
than that offered by Wambaugh. For Wambaugh the general proposi-
tion necessary to a decision must eventually be arrived at by anyone
who studies the legal problem and the result diligently enough.8 3 Pol-
lock has no such confidence in the unaided powers of pure reason to
discern the "true doctrine" of a case. More likely, the correct result
would be reached for the wrong reasons, if deduced from a general rule.
"[A] correct induction may disguise itself ... in the shape of an incor-
rect deduction.",8 4
III. GOODHART AND THE RATIO DECIDENDI OF A CASE
It was left to Arthur L. Goodhart to build on, refine, and apply the
paradigm of legal method sketched out by Pollock. As Goodhart notes
in his introduction to a volume of Pollock's essays, The Science of Case-
Law is "[p]erhaps... of even greater interest to-day than it was when it
was first published, for it deals with a number of problems which have
become of major concern to the modern jurist."8 5
A. Goodhart's Original Theory
Goodhart accepts the basic paradigm of an inductive legal method
in predicting decisions of courts, but he also insists that judges are
guided by "principles" in their adherence to precedent. These princi-
ples, the "rationes decidendi" of cases, are narrower than Wambaugh's
"doctrine" of a case, because they are found neither in the reasons given
for a decision nor in the rule of law set forth in an opinion. In this sense
Goodhart favors a "scientific" method, in the style of Oliphant and
Pollock, that does not take judicial doctrine at face value but instead
remains at the more reliable level of observable judicial behavior. Al-
though the reasons given for a decision may be wrong and the rule of
law set forth by the judge may be demonstrably incorrect, the case may
nevertheless be a good precedent. In fact, Goodhart asserts that "it is
precisely some of those cases which have been decided on incorrect
premises or reasoning which have become the most important in the
law."8 6 Our modern law of torts has developed through a series of bad
83. See STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 20-22; see also supra text accompanying notes
24-28.
84. The Science of Case-Law, supra note 70, at 182-83.
85. Id. at xxxii.
86. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 163 (1930),
reprinted in A. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 1 (1972) (subsequent
references are to the YALE L.J. version [hereinafter Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case]).
The phrase ratio decidendi may be translated as "rationale of decision" or "reason for the
decision" or (even more literally) "rationale of deciding." It is, according to Goodhart, "[w]ith the
possible exception of the legal term 'malice,' ... the most misleading expression in English law, for
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arguments, property law is based on misunderstood history, and yet
their authority is not doubted. Because "[a] bad reason may often make
good law," the precedential value of decisions cannot lie in the reasons
judges give for them or the rules of law they formulate in explaining
them. It must lie elsewhere. "There may be no rule of law set forth in the
opinion, or the rule when stated may be too wide or too narrow....
Nevertheless each of these cases contains a principle which can be dis-
covered on proper analysis.""7 In other words, in setting forth the
wrong rule, or stating it too broadly or narrowly, the judge has not set
forth the ratio decidendi of the case, and may not have "set forth" any-
thing at all.
Like Pollock and Oliphant before him, Goodhart feels free to "sec-
ond-guess" judges in their legal reasoning and their statements of the
law."8 Goodhart can be seen as simply attempting to provide more con-
tent for the process of legal decisionmaking than Pollock or Oliphant.
Yet, Goodhart does not, unlike Oliphant, resort to the purely behav-
ioral study of judges' decisionmaking. Nor does he follow Pollock in
developing a merely formal inductive paradigm. While Goodhart feels
free to second-guess judges' statements of law, he holds sacred their
statements of fact. In so doing, he brings some new considerations to
bear on our understanding of the "facts" of a case.
Goodhart states in about ten different ways that we must under-
stand the "facts" of a case as the judge saw them and not as we or the
record can show them to have been. "We are bound by the judge's
statement of the facts even though it is patent that he has mistated
them, for it is on the facts as he, perhaps incorrectly, has seen them that
he has based his judgment." 9 Since the judge selects and interprets the
facts on which the decision is based, it would be "illogical" to be bound
by the judge's conclusion but not by his factual premises. "It is by his
choice of the material facts that the judge creates law." 90
the reason which the judge gives for his decision is never the binding part of the precedent." Id. at
162.
87. Id. at 163, 165 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 163 ("New principles, of which their
authors were unconscious or which they have misunderstood, have been established by these judg-
ments.") (emphasis added).
88. However, Goodhart indicates that an important qualification to his theory is neces-
sary where analogical reasoning is at issue:
[hen a case is used merely as an analogy, and not as a direct binding precedent, the
reasoning by which the court reached its judgment carries greater weight than the conclu-
sion itself. The second court, being free to reach its own conclusion, will only adopt the
reasoning of the first court if it considers it to be correct and desirable. In such analogous
precedents the ratio decidendi of the case can with some truth be described as the reason
of the case.
Id. at 181 n.73.
89. Id. at 170.
90. Id. at 169; cf. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 127-28 (1949).
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For Goodhart, then, the first task is to ascertain which facts the
judge took into consideration, then to determine which of them were
"material" to the decision. The ratio decidendi of a case is the conclu-
sion that the judge reaches on the basis of the facts deemed material and
those excluded as immaterial. 9' If in a certain case the court finds that
facts A, B, and C exist, excludes fact C as immaterial, and decides X,
then this case establishes a broader principle than if fact C had been
included. Goodhart applies this analysis to Rylands v. Fletcher92 as
follows:
Facts of the Case
Fact I. D had a reservoir built on his land. Fact II. The con-
tractor who built it was negligent. Fact III. Water escaped and
injured P. Conclusion. D is liable to P.
Material Facts as Seen by the Court
Fact I. D had a reservoir built on his land. Fact III. Water
escaped and injured P. Conclusion. D is liable to P.
By the omission of Fact II, the doctrine of "absolute lia-
bility" was established. 93
There is a presumption against broad principles of law. In Good-
hart's scheme this may usefully be viewed as a presumption against
finding a fact to be immaterial; the smaller the number of material facts,
the wider the principle of law will be. Goodhart's principle that the facts
of the case must be considered to be as the judge saw them, and not
necessarily as they actually were, can lead to some strange conse-
quences. If ajudge decides X on the basis of facts A, B, and C, then even
if the judge has actually made a mistake as to fact C, the decision is still
good law for those "facts." But if the court did not determine the exis-
tence or materiality of fact C, or treated it as a hypothetical possibility,
then the decision is dictum as to C-even if C was actually the case!
91. See Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, supra note 86, at 179:
In a certain case the court finds that facts A, B, and C exist. It then excludes fact A as
immaterial, and on facts B and C it reaches conclusion X. What is the ratio decidendi of
this case? There are two principles: (1) In any future case in which the facts are A, B, and
C, the court must reach conclusion X and (2) in any future case in which the facts are B
and C the court must reach conclusion X. In the second case the absence of fact A does
not affect the result, for fact A has been held to be immaterial.
92. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
93. Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, supra note 86, at 175.
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Everything depends upon the intentions of the judge in ascertaining the
material facts.
Goodhart's theory is an improvement on Pollock's paradigm be-
cause it limits the precedential significance of a case to its material facts
and serves as a reminder that the judge's perspective on the facts of a
case must be considered. It is probably useful to make a distinction
between saying "a case is authority for a proposition based on all its
facts," and saying "[a case] is authority for a proposition based on
those facts only which were seen by the court as material." 94 Pollock
and Oliphant may have been naive in taking the facts of a case as a
given.95 Goodhart's naivete, however, may consist in the notion that
we can really "get at" the facts deemed material by a judge. Goodhart
offers a few techniques based on common law presumptions, such as
"all facts which the judge specifically states to be material must be con-
sidered material." 96 But all the techniques appear to involve accepting
the judge's version of his or her reasoning process, as expressed in the
opinion, at face value. If anything, ascertaining all the facts would seem
easier than determining which of them were actually considered mate-
rial by the judge. Yet Goodhart warns us that "[tjhe emphasis which
American law libraries are now placing on collecting the whole records
in the leading cases may prove to be a dangerous one, for such collec-
tions tend to encourage a practice which is inconvenient in operation
and disastrous in theory." 97
If we must humor the judge's choice of the facts and take the
judge's description of that choice at face value, why not accept his or
her statements of law as authoritative too?98 The answer might be that
only the judge was there, at nisi prius, to determine the facts first hand,
whereas we are all able to draw our own conclusions about statements
of law. For Goodhart, however, the judge may be totally wrong as to
the facts and still make perfectly good law. In Goodhart's world, adju-
dication begins to resemble a kind of thought experiment: If the judge
thought those were the facts, then the ratio decidendi is .... The judge
creates law by choosing the material facts, by selecting and interpreting
them, and even more so in selecting and interpreting legal principles.
94. Id. at 174.
95. Cf id.; A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 159 (judges respond predictably
to stimuli of the facts of cases before them).
96. Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, supra note 86, at 182; see also id. at 173-
79.
97. Id. at 172; cf. Arnold, Book Review, 41 YALE L.J. 318, 318 (1931) ("Librarians
should therefore use every effort to keep such records of cases from immature students.").
98. Thurman Arnold has ably criticized the assumption running through Goodhart's
whole analysis that propositions of "fact" and "law" can be unproblematically distinguished. See
Arnold, supra note 97, at 318-19 ("The author is not troubled by what 'facts' are, nor by their
variety, nor with distinguishing them from conclusions of 'law.' ").
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Yet, for Goodhart, it ultimately makes no difference if a judge is
"wrong" about either the facts or the law of a case. The facts are of
interest only as the judge saw them, and the ratio decidendi is not
sought in the judge's reasons or rules of law.
B. Later Discussion of the Ratio Decidendi
Several decades after Goodhart's original article appeared, an in-
tense scholarly debate over his theories broke out in the pages of the
English Modern Law Review9 9 and elsewhere.' Although this debate
has much of the characteristic tempest-in-a-teapot flavor of discussions
in British academic journals, 10 1 a few valuable points do emerge, and
the issues in the debate bring together in a helpful way a number of
themes in the theory of precedential authority.
Traditional theorists of the ratio decidendi conceive of it as an au-
thoritative rule of law directly binding-like a statute or constitution-
on subsequent courts. Sir John Salmond, for example, says that:
A precedent ... is a judicial decision which contains in
itself a principle. The underlying principle which thus forms
its authoritative element is often termed the ratio decidendi.
The concrete decision is binding between the parties to it, but
it is the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of
law as regards the world at large. 10 2
The enterprise of determining the ratio decidendi of a case traditionally
proceeds on the following basic assumptions: 1) every case has one, and
only one, ratio decidendi that explains the holding on the (material)
99. See Montrose, Ratio Decidendi and the House of Lords, 20 MOD. L. REv. 124 (1957);
Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. Rv. 413 (1957); Montrose, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case. 20 MOD. L. Rv. 587 (1957); Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 21
MOD. L. REv. 155 (1958); Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REv. 117 (1959);
Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REv. 453 (1959); Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio
Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REv. 597 (1959) [subsequent references to these articles will be by MOD. L.
REv. volume and page number].
100. See Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961); J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAW-
YERS' REASONINGS 267-80 (1964); Montrose, The Language of, and a Notation for, the Doctrine of
Precedent (pts. I & 2), 2 U.W. AUSTL. ANN. L. REv. 301, 504 (1951-53); Stone, 1966 And All That!
Loosing the Chains of Precedent, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1162 (1969).
101. See, e.g., Goodhart, 22 MOD. L. REv., supra note 99, at 117 (hesitating before inter-
vening in "this gladiatorial combat"); id. at 120 ("Perhaps some confusion might have been
avoided if Mr. Simpson, instead of relying on Professor Montrose's interpretation of Dr. Glanville
Williams' brief summary of my thesis, had referred to the thesis itself."); cf. Stone, 22 MOD. L.
REv., supra note 99, at 600 ("This present article... is not designed to defend or even explain the
present writer's position."); Simpson, 21 MOD. L. REv., supra note 99, at 158 n.17 (criticizing
Montrose for citing his own article improperly).
102. J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 223 (11th ed. 1957).
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facts; 2) the ratio decidendi can be determined through an analysis of
the particular case itself; 3) this unique and unchanging rule or princi-
ple, and it alone, is what is binding on later courts.10 3 The traditional
approach to the ratio decidendi is, to use Julius Stone's label, "prescrip-
tive"; it seeks to establish "the limits within which, as a matter of law, a
prior decision prescribes a binding rule for later decisions. "104
The more modest approach 'favored by Stone, Oliphant, and the
legal realists may be termed "descriptive." Instead of seeking to identify
and delimit the reasoning that a later court is logically and legally
bound to follow, these scholars are content to describe or explain the
actual process of reasoning by which a decision was reached, without
regard to whether this reasoning is binding in a later case. These schol-
ars simply attempt to set forth how, as a matter of fact, present deci-
sions are related to prior decisions. Indeed, the legal realists may be
viewed as abandoning en bloc all attempts to determine the "prescrip-
tive" ratio decidendi of a case and as claiming instead that the ratio is
wholly at the discretion or even whim of later judges. 10 5
According to the traditional, "prescriptive" view, the ratio
decidendi expresses a legal principle logically necessary to the decision
of a case. This is, in effect, Wambaugh's position, though for him the
issue is embedded in the context of judicial restraint. Common law
courts do not decide unnecessary questions in cases; the questions they
do decide are those, and only those, necessary to the disposition of the
case.'0 6 Thus, "the reason of the decision, the ratio decidendi, must be
a general rule without which the case must have been decided
otherwise." 10 7
Much ink has Since been spilled to show that, as a logical matter,
no single justification for a decision can claim pride of place if-also as
a logical matter-no particular factual description of a case can be
103. See Stone, 22 MOD. L. REv., supra note 99, at 602-03; cf Sartorius, The Doctrine of
Precedent and the Problem of Relevance, 53 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 343, 346
(1967).
104. Stone, 22 MOD. L. REv., supra note 99, at 602.
105. See A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY 89 (1984) ("It is
scarcely an exaggeration to claim that the whole American Realist movement insofar as it relates
to 'rule-skepticism' is based on the notion that the ratio decidendi of a case cannot be securely
determined and is at the whim of any subsequent judge."); Stone, 22 MOD. L. Ray., supra note 99,
at 600-01 & n.2 (American realists abandon, or at least suspend, the search for the prescriptive
ratio decidendi).
106. See STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 19 ("Mhe court need and [therefore (?)] must
not do more than the case at bar demands....:').
107. Id. at 18 (The unnecessary residue is dictum, the two. concepts being comple-
mentary.).
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deemed authoritative.' For Wambaugh, as previously noted,"°9 this
problem does not really arise. Indeed, in offhand passages he refers to
different cases as "identical."" '  For a formalist like Wambaugh, the
facts of cases fall more or less naturally into a few familiar patterns. The
practicing lawyer does not spend much time pondering how to classify
the facts of the cases he tries;"' if he did, he would probably succumb
to some sort of legal paralysis or incapacitating epistemological confu-
sion. Oliphant, Stone, and others have obligingly documented this po-
tential for confusion in their powerful explications of the choices oper-
ating in the classification of facts.
In order for a legally cognizant claim to be made, the world must
be carved up in meaningful ways, our experiences classified according
to their important features.' 1 2 If everything were equally important, it
would be utterly impossible to formulate even the most rudimentary
legal complaint."' Thus, we force the world into our patterns of mean-
ingfulness by making a deliberate, pragmatic selection of the "relevant"
or "significant" or "essential" or "material" facts from the teeming
mass of irrelevant, insignificant, unessential, and immaterial ones. 14
108. See, e.g., Stone, 22 MOD. L. REv., supra note 99, at 602-07; Sartorius, supra note 103,
at 348-49.
109. See supra note 21.
110. See STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 14 ("every case ought to furnish a precedent for
all other cases in which the circumstances, save as to unessential matters, are identical"); id. at 64
("precisely identical cases seldom occur"); id. at 96 (subordinate courts may decline to follow
distasteful decisions "in cases not identical").
11. See id. at 68-69:
The immaterial features are features that have been decided to be immaterial by other
cases, or that, in the lawyer's opinion, would certainly be decided to be immaterial. The
lawyer may hardly know that he casts aside certain features. Still less may he realize the
reason why he casts them aside. Long ago he may have read a case justifying him in
ignoring some features of the case now before him; or he may be acting upon knowledge
that came to him through a text-book; or he may be simply following his own reasoning
faculties, which for years have been trained to think along the lines pursued by his most
learned predecessors in the profession. Certain it is that for one reason or another he
does cast aside many of the circumstances of the case under examination, for example,
the identity of the parties, the time of the transaction, the things that were the subjects of
the contract or of the tort; and, without knowing that he has really been combining the
results of numerous actual or hypothetical cases, he discovers the doctrine established by
the case that is under his eye.
(footnote omitted).
112. See generally M. MERLEAu-PoNry, TmE STRUCTURE OF BEmAVIOR (1967) (philosophi-
cal implications of Gestalt theory); E. DURKHE1M & M. MAUSS, PfMrVE CLASSIFICATION (1963).
113. See, e.g., A. ROBBE-GRILLET, THE ERASERS (1964).
114. See M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 190-92 (. MacQuarrie & E. Robinson trans.
1962):
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a "signification" over some naked thing
which is present at hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within the
world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is
disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid
out by the interpretation.... In every case interpretation is grounded in something we see
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In Donoghue v. Stevenson,11 for example, the plaintiff was un-
pleasantly surprised (and allegedly became ill) to find the partially de-
composed remains of a snail in a bottle of ginger beer she had been
drinking. The plaintiff prevailed in her suit against the manufacturer,
but was it "essential" to her case that a snail in a bottle was involved,
instead of, say, a similarly situated mouse,' 1 6 safety pin, 1 7 or even a
human toe?"I 8 Would Donoghue be good precedent for a case involv-
ing, not a decomposed snail, but rather a fresh and lively one? One and
the same "fact" may be described at radically different levels of general-
ity. Did the result in Donoghue turn on the characterization of the agent
of harm as a snail (decomposed or otherwise), or "any noxious physical
foreign body, or any noxious foreign element, physical or not, or any
noxious element"?" 9 The facts of any case admit of as many different
in advance-in a fore-sight. This foresight "takes the first cut" out of what has been
taken into our fore-having, and it does so with a view to a definite way in which this can
be interpreted. Anything understood which is held in our fore-having, and towards
which we set our sights "foresightedly," becomes conceptualizable through the interpre-
tation.... An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something
presented to us. If, when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in
the sense of exact textual interpretation, one likes to appeal to what "stands there," then
one finds that what "stands there" in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious
undiscussed assumption of the person who does the interpreting.
(translation altered).
.115. [1932] App. Cas. 562, discussed in Stone, 22 MOD. L. REy., supra note 99, at 603-05;
J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAwYERs' RxASONINGS 269-71 (1964); R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAW 29-31, 43-45, 48-49 (3d ed. 1979); E. LEvI, AN INTRoDuCToN TO LEGAL REAsONING
25-26 (1949).
. 116. See Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Beverage
Sold, 77 A.L.R.2d 215, 257-63 (1961) (annotating cases involving "mouse in bottle or other
container").
117. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McBride, 180 Ark. 193, 20 S.W.2d 862 (1929);
Dalton Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Watkins, 70 Ga. App. 790, 29 S.E.2d 281 (1944); Schulte v. Pyle,
95 Ga. App. 229,97 S.E.2d 558 (1957); Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Causey, 28 Ala. App.
115, 180 So. 588 (1938); cf. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(193 1) (pin in loaf of bread; shopkeeper liable for breach of implied warranty of merchantability).
118. See Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918); cf. id. at
500, 78 So. at 366 ("We can imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human toes could not be
left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found in chewing tobacco, it seems to us that somebody
has been very careless.").
119. Stone, 22 MOD. L. REV., supra note 99, at 603; cf. id. at 604:
As to none of these facts.., and as to none of the several alternative levels of statement
of each of them, could it be said on the basis of the report of Donoghue v. Stevenson alone
that it was on its face not "material" (in the logical sense) to the holding in that case.
Even as to the time of litigation, as to which we are most tempted to say that this at least
must be "immaterial" on the face of it, we must be careful to avoid a petitioprincipii. Are
we really prepared to assert with dogmatism that Donoghue v. Stevenson should have
been, and would in fact have been, so decided in 1800? If not, it follows that logically, i.e.,
apart from any special indication that should be drawn from the precedent court's own
attitude, the "ratio" of Donoghue v. Stevenson did not compel later courts to impose
liability in any case where only some of the above possible "material" facts, and some
levels of statement of them, were found.... mhis reduces the range of binding ratio
decidendi to vanishing point.
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and competing descriptions as there are combinations of distinct
"facts." Each description may, in turn, be stated at virtually any desired
level of generality.
Is there some one step on some one stair which is the decision
of the case within the meaning of the mandate stare decisis?
.. To ask whether there exists a coercion of some logic to
make that choice either inevitable or beneficent, searches the
significance of stare decisis in judicial government and the
soundness of scholarship in law. 120
These questions involve, to use a current phrase, "essentially con-
tested concepts." Since any number of competing rationes decidendi
can explain the decision in a case, no one of them can be considered
logically necessary to the decision. Thus the notion of the single, deter-
minative, logically necessary justification for a decision cannot be suc-
cessfully maintained. From a strictly logical point of view, the ratio
decidendi is inherently indeterminate.' 2 1 Moreover, many of the sup-
posed judicial liberties taken with the distinction between ratio
decidendi and dictum-and, indeed, the alleged "meaninglessness" of
the distinction itself-can be traced to the inherent indeterminacy of the
ratio decidendi. 122
See also Sartorius, supra note 103, at 349:
The point is... that even where it would be correct to say that the facts of a given case
stood "on all fours" with the facts of a binding precedent, it will always be possible to
construct a rule under which the prior decision is subsumable, and under which any
decision whatsoever in the instant case is subsumable as well. As Cohen has put it, "To
the cold eyes of logic the difference between the names of the parties in... two decisions
bulks as large as the difference between care and negligence."
(footnote omitted).
120. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 73; cf. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM
AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 269 (1964):
inhere will always be more than one, and indeed many, competing versions of "the
material facts"; and there will therefore not be merely one but many rationes, any of
which will explain the holding on those facts, and no one of which therefore is strictly
necessary to explain it. For apart from any selection by the precedent court, all the logical
possibilities remain open; and in the logician's sense it is possible to draw as many gen-
eral propositions from a given decision (each of which will "explain" it) as there are
possible combinations of distinguishable facts in it.
121. See H. CAIRNS, THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 80 (1941) (the question-what single
principle does a particular case establish?-is "strictly nonsensical, that is, inherently incapable of
being answered").
For suggestions that Oliphant, Stone, and their followers overstate the indeterminacy of the
ratio decidendi, see Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. Rv. 571, 587 (1987) (arguing that when rules
of relevance come from the larger, extra-legal world, and to the extent they are relied upon in
framing precedents, "some determinations of similarity are incontestable within particular cul-
tures or subcultures"; not all characterizations of a past event are always and equally "up for
grabs").
122. See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 267-68 (1964).
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The "descriptive" view of the ratio decidendi is an attempt to pro-
vide extra-logical support for the traditional doctrine of precedent."12
On this view the ratio decidendi is the rule or principle that the prece-
dent-setting court considered to be necessary for its decision. 124 Even if
the court was wrong, and no such single, logically necessary ("prescrip-
tive") rule can be determined, later judges might still consider them-
selves governed by the legal principle formulated by the earlier court or
the process of reasoning by which the earlier court reached its
decision. 125
Even as a purely "descriptive" matter, however, this view does not
accurately reflect judicial practice or informed criticism of that practice.
As Goodhart readily noted, 126 a decision may form a binding prece-
dent, and be cited and recognized as such, even when the precedent-
setting court has offered no hint as to its reasoning. 127 Later courts
simply supply or infer a "prescriptive" rule of decision from the facts
and the result. Moreover, it often happens that a judge will explicitly
reject the rule of law laid down by an earlier court, even while purport-
ing to be following the "decision" in the earlier case and acknowledging
it as binding precedent. 128 Thus, even on a purely "descriptive" level,
the doctrine enunciated by a court in making a decision is not necessar-
ily what is authoritative about that decision. 129
In his later pronouncements Goodhart indicates that some combi-
nation of the "rule" and the "result" may be necessary to explain the
authority of judicial precedents:
If it were possible to devise a method by which all precedents
would become determinate, then the difficulties of interpreta-
tion would disappear, but I believe that this is a vain hope. It
is not a valid criticism of a system, therefore, to say that some
precedents will always remain indeterminate.... [F]urther de-
cisions are frequently required before the scope of a principle
is finally determined.... When we take one step we may not
be certain how far this will ultimately lead us, but it is useful to
123. See id. at 323-35 (exploring the limits of formal logical reasoning).
124. See Sartorius, supra note 103, at 349-50.
125. Wambaugh, for example, may be viewed as trying to "have it both ways" in main-
taining both (I) that the doctrine of a case is the rule or principle without which the case could not
have been decided as it was ("prescriptive") and (2) that the doctrine of a case must be a proposi-
tion that is in the mind of the court ("descriptive"). See supra Section I. In fact, there would be no
inconsistency here, if the notion of a "prescriptive" ratio decidendi made sense.
126. See supra Section III(A).
127. Cf. E. WAMBAUGH, STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 23 ("A decision creates a prece-
dent whether there be an opinion or not.").
128. See Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (1941).
129. For further discussion of this point, see Goodhart's critique of the "descriptive"
theory, as analyzed supra in Section III(A).
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know in what direction we are headed. Paton's metaphor is a
sound one: "One case, so to speak, plots a point on the graph
of tort, but to draw the curve of the law we need a series of
points." 1 3
0
These are important concessions. They amount to an implicit acknowl-
edgment that legal opinions and their concomitant "doctrines"-unlike
statutes, constitutions, and other legal "texts"--cannot be taken as di-
rect sources of legal authority. They are not fully binding on later
courts, because their precise contours have not yet been articulated in
formulaic and canonical fashion. Instead, they are rather more like "le-
gal experiments" whose definitive meaning and results must await fur-
ther confirmation by other members of the professional community.
The origins and implications of this view, as well as those of the more
traditional conception of precedent, will be explored more fully in the
remaining section.
IV. THE TEXT AND THE EXPERIMENT: Two PARADIGMS OF LEGAL
AUTHORITY
Two contrasting conceptions of precedential authority emerge in
the analysis of the jurisprudential theories discussed above. The first,
the "traditional" conception, is that an excessively broad principle,
"unnecessary to the decision" of a case, is dictum. The second concep-
tion, present at least implicitly in each theory, is that a principle too
narrowly tied to the particular facts of one case cannot be part of the
ratio decidendi of other cases. These contrasting conceptions of prece-
dential authority derive from two distinct intellectual traditions: the hu-
manities and the empirical sciences. Briefly, in the humanities, author-
ity derives from a text or primary source. Interpretation of the text is
thus narrow and deferential. By contrast, in the empirical sciences, the
experiment is the source of authority. The experiment is not authorita-
tive in itself, but only to the extent that it can be replicated and that it
fits within and extends a more general framework of scientific theory.
These two conceptions of legal authority exist in an essential tension,
derived from their opposed foundations in the humanities and empiri-
cal sciences. Yet both are necessary and, perhaps, inevitable in a system
that demands both scientific validity and logical consistency.
130. Goodhart, 22 MOD. L. Ray., supra note 99, at 124 (footnote omitted). "Guesswork
must always play a part in legal interpretation," adds Goodhart; "this is what makes the law so
interesting." Id.
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A. Narrow and Broad Forms of Precedential Authority
The principle that excessively broad principles are dicta is most
clearly expressed in Wambaugh's theory. Wambaugh defends this con-
ception through a series of reflections on the policies served by princi-
ples of judicial restraint and separation of powers, and by the "case or
controversy" and standing requirements. In his later pronouncements
Wambaugh can be read as tracing dicta to procedural imperfections in
the legal process, especially those that make it likely a question has re-
ceived insufficient judicial attention or thought. But this latter situation
simply represents another variation of dicta as excessively broad pro-
nouncements, since it typically arises when unforeseen circumstances
make inapplicable (or applicable) a legal rule that should originally
have been formulated more narrowly or restricted more carefully.13
Oliphant's position differs from Wambaugh's on many points, but
he probably speaks for both of them in bemoaning the decline of an era
in which legal forms could be used with more precision, and in which
the fit of form to content allowed less discretion as to how abstractly or
generally propositions of law would be treated. Pollock's disdain for
broad principles flows from his unwillingness to understand by abstract
legal rules anything other than the incremental, empirically acquired
results of particular cases. For Pollock, induction as a method yields
nominalism as a theory.
Finally, Goodhart, borrowing both from his ally Pollock and his
opponent Oliphant, excludes from his version of scientific, inductive
legal method the whole realm of legal reasoning, preferring to replace it
with a calculus of conclusions based on whatever view of the facts a
particular court may have taken. Goodhart's may actually be the view
that is inherently the most neutral with respect to the conception of
dicta as overbroad rules unnecessary to a decision. For Goodhart-
despite the weak "presumptions" against broad principles he offers as
techniques of interpretation-the judge's view of the facts is all-control-
ling. Consequently, the development of sound and binding legal doc-
trine does not depend on judges' having stated their rules of law nar-
rowly enough, or even having stated them at all.
A second, distinct and quite different conception of precedential
authority can be read into all of the competing theories discussed
above: A case cannot have authority as a precedent without embodying
a relatively broad, general proposition of law. ' 32 This alternative con-
131. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 77-91 (1960) ("leeways of
precedent").
132. See E. WAMBAUGH, STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 102-03:
In so far as a decision, if examined in accordance with the principles heretofore described
for ascertaining the doctrine of a case, does not establish any given proposition of law,
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ception reorders the usual categorial priorities, but it has always implic-
itly formed an integral part of the traditional doctrines. Thus, although
Wambaugh certainly does not emphasize it when he lays down the rule
that the court must pass on each case "precisely" as it would on an
essentially similar case, he means that the court has a duty to follow a
relatively broad rule.133 Wambaugh then quickly switches to a discus-
sion of how this lends uniformity to adjudication-a distinct concern-
but this discussion originates in the context of observing that no two
cases are ever precisely identical. 34
It is in this same context that Oliphant makes his interesting claim
that the holding of a case must be "a proposition of law covering a
group of fact situations ... as a minimum, the fact situation of the
instant case and at least one other,"' 35 if the common law system of
precedent is even to get off the ground. Clearly, that which is concrete,
unique, and absolutely specific to one case cannot serve as part of the
binding ratio decidendi for other cases. 136
To bring together into one class even this minimum of two
fact situations however similar they may be, always has re-
quired and always will require an abstraction.... Classifica-
tion is abstraction. An element or elements common to the
two fact situations put into one class must be drawn out from
each to become the content of the category and the subject of
the proposition of law which is thus applied to the two
cases. 137
Oliphant goes on to complain about how fortuitous this grouping of
cases by single attributes has become and how easily it leads to useless
and harmful over-generalization. But his statement of the minimum re-
quirement of generalization or abstraction remains as a theoretical
boundary. Finally, though Pollock prefers not to speak the language of
abstract concepts in law, he does say that it is perfectly-appropriate to
the decision is really of no authority at all; for it is not a precedent as to the given propo-
sition. Authoritativeness is conceded to precedents, and to precedents only.
(footnote omitted).
133. "Mhe court must pass upon each case precisely as it would pass upon a similar case,
that is to say, in accordance with a general rule." Id. at 15.
134. See id.; cf Dubuque v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 39 Iowa 56, 79-80 (1874):
A judgment that A recover of B one thousand dollars is not to be cited as a precedent in a
subsequent case to support the right of C to recover the same sum from D, for the judg-
ment is simply a conclusion reached by the application of rules of law to certain facts. We
are to look farther in a case than to the judgment to find that which constitutes a prece-
dent. It is found in the rules of law, which are the foundation of a judgment.
135. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 72 (emphasis added). Note how
this claim goes against the grain of Oliphant's analysis.
136. See Stone, 22 MOD. L. Rav., supra note 99, at 605-06.
137. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, supra note 45, at 72 (footnote omitted).
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seek out "general principles" in predicting the outcomes of easy cases;
that there are such things as "similar facts" to be sought out and com-
pared in hard cases; and that, for the scientist, "the consolidated results
of experience" are "namely, established scientific truths expressed in a
general form."138
A theory of dictum as that which does not set a precedent explains
the need to deny precedential value to legal rules that are too specific,
concrete, or particularized. Austin states in this connection that:
[Law] made judicially must be found in the general grounds
(or must be found in the general reasons) of judicial decisions
... as detached or abstracted from the specific peculiarities of
the decided or resolved cases. Since no two cases are precisely
alike, the decision of a specific case may partly turn upon rea-
sons which are suggested to the judge by its specific peculiari-
ties or differences. And that part of the decision which turns
on those differences (or that part of the decision which con-
sists of those special reasons), cannot serve as a precedent for
subsequent decisions, and cannot serve as a rule or guide of
conduct. 13
9
A rule of law may be unnecessary to the decision because it is stated too
narrowly. In Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, 40 for example, the
court stated, in ruling on a worthless guarantee fraudulently given by
the defendant's manager: "The general rule is, that the master is an-
swerable for every such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in
the course of the service and for the master's benefit, though no express
command or privity of the master be proved."1 41 This was generally
thought to be a correct statement of the rule until the House of Lords
held, in Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.,1 42 that it was too narrow and that
the words "and for the master's benefit" were merely descriptive of the
specific facts of Barwick and not a necessary part of the principle in-
volved. The Barwick principle was upheld, but the Lords added that "it
is ... a mistake to qualify it by saying that it only applies when the
principal has profited by the fraud."
143
138. F. POLLOCK, The Science of Case-Law, supra note 70, at 175.
139. 2 J. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 627 (5th ed. 1885).
140. 2 L.R.-Ex. 258 (1867).
141. Id. at 264-65.
142. [1912] App. Cas. 716.
143. Id. at 736; see also Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, supra note
86, at 167.
The case of California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), provides a more recent example of a
decision that may be considered dictum for the narrowness, rather than breadth, of its holding. In
Carney the Court had to decide whether a mobile home was more like a car or a house. Defendant
Carney's Dodge Mini Motor Home was parked, with its curtains drawn, in a downtown San
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A complete theory of legal authority must take into account the
non-precedential character of propositions of law that are too narrow,
individualized, or particularized. As analysis proceeds in this direction,
Diego parking lot. After receiving information that the vehicle was being used to distribute narcot-
ics, the police watched it for more than an hour. They then knocked on the door and, when Carney
appeared, entered and searched the mobile home without a warrant or consent. Marijuana was
found in the kitchen area. The California Supreme Court overturned Carney's conviction, ruling
that, for purposes of a search warrant, the vehicle should have been treated like a home and that
the narcotics should therefore have been suppressed as evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger. The Chief Justice
set out to construct as narrow an opinion as possible. He first explained that the "automobile
exception" to the search warrant requirement stemmed historically from two factors: the greater
mobility and the reduced expectation of privacy that one has in an automobile. That one would
have less of a feeling of privacy in a car than in a house seems reasonable enough-but probably'
not for the reason Chief Justice Burger seizes upon:
These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be
searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of travel-
ing on the public highways....
The public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because
of this compelling governmental need for regulation.
Id. at 392. This strange reading of the diminished expectation of privacy is the linchpin of the Chief
Justice's analysis, because, if it were the real explanation, then mobile homes would indeed be
more like cars than houses.
Chief Justice Burger does go on to concede that "respondent's vehicle possessed some, if not
many of the attributes of a home" and that "[iun our increasingly mobile society, many vehicles
used for transportation can be and are being used not only for transportation but for shelter, i.e.,
as a 'home' or 'residence."' Id. at 393. But here an alternative ground of decision comes into play:
An "objective observer" would have concluded that the mobile home was more like a car than a
house. The "automobile exception" has historically turned on the mobility of the vehicle "and on
the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for
transportation." Id. at 394. Here, the vehicle was "so situated that an objective observer would
conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle." Id. at 393. Finally, in a
footnote, the Chief Justice narrowly circumscribed the boundaries of the Carney holding:
We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor home that
is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence.
Among the factors that might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would be
required in such a circumstance is its location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or
instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is
connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road.
Id. at 394 n.3.
Justice Stevens dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Essen-
tially, Justice Stevens argues that the Court should never have taken the case in the first place and
that, in any event, the Chief Justice completely misreads the "expectation of privacy" associated
with a mobile home.
In deciding Carney, Justice Stevens asserts, the Court has "entered new territory prema-
turely." Id. at 395-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court's aggressive reversals of state and lower
federal court suppressions of evidence have made it "the High Magistrate for every warrantless
search and seizure" and have burdened its docket with cases presenting "fact-bound errors of
minimal significance." Id. at 396. Here, in what was "at most only a modest extension of our
Fourth Amendment precedents," the California Supreme Court had upheld an individual citizen's
privacy claim against the law enforcement interest of the state. "[Tihis ... situation ... rarely
presents a compelling reason for Court review in the absence of a fully percolated conflict." Id. at
398. By a "percolated" conflict Justice Stevens means one that has undergone the "painstaking
scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication" in the lower courts and received the benefit of extensive
debate and refinement of alternative principles that might accommodate the various interests in-
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some of the implicit policy rationales favoring broad, general rules of
law also begin to emerge against the background of the tradition. But,
between the two contrasting-indeed, opposed---conceptions of legal
authority outlined above, there exists an intellectual gulf that cannot be
ignored. This opposition is not incidental or accidental. Instead, it re-
flects a deep, inherent tension in the intellectual ancestry of the legal
profession and the academic discipline of law. The relatively recent de-
velopment of common law reasoning as an independent intellectual en-
terprise draws on an ambivalent heritage and divides its loyalties be-
tween the humanities and the empirical sciences. The resulting
bifurcated, contradictory notions of legal authority are directly tracea-
ble to the differing notions of authority in these two great intellectual
traditions, upon which the law of judicial precedents has more or less
unconsciously been patterned.' 44
B. The Text
In the classical tradition of the humanities, authority derives prin-
cipally from an original text or other primary source. Etymologically,
volved. By forging ahead in a vacuum the Court prematurely established a rule for the entire
nation.
A related benefit of a series of litigated cases in the lower courts is that they would "define
the contours" of the sociological judgment necessitated by a case like Carney. Justice Stevens cites
Trailer Life, Motor Home, and R V Lifestyle Magazine in support of his claim that "[i]n this case,
the Court can barely glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with recreational vehicles and mobile
living quarters." Id. at 399. Justice Stevens goes on to a detailed examination of the motor home in
question, finding that it was "designed to accommodate a breadth of ordinary everyday living." Id.
at 406. (Interestingly, neither the majority nor the dissent wonders whether respondent actually
lived in the mobile home, or whether he also had a "real" home.) "Although it may not be a
castle," observes Justice Stevens, "a motor home is usually the functional equivalent of a hotel
room, a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin." Id. at 407. Hence Justice
Stevens' ultimate "sociological reading" of the situation presented in Carney: "I believe that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize that the expectations of privacy within [a motor home] are not unlike
the expectations one has in a fixed dwelling." Id. at 402.
Carney may be considered an example of the counter-theory, suggested above, that a deci-
sion may be dictum for its narrowness of holding. The issues presented in the case are so fact-
specific, and Chief Justice Burger's grounds for decision so narrowly drawn, that several more
cases will undoubtedly be required to fill in the empirical gaps and establish a workable rule.
Justice Stevens' argument is that the Court, rather than setting the narrowest of non-precedents,
should have declined to set any precedent at all. Only after the accumulated wisdom of lower court
adjudication, refined in the crucible of individual circumstances, has winnowed out the "unneces-
sary and discordant elements of doctrine" and preserved "whatever is pure and sound and fine,"
should the High Court enter the fray. And only then, Justice Stevens seems also to be saying, can
the Court really make the kind of authoritative sociological or institutional reading that would be
required to support a "binding judgment on the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 399.
144. See generally C.P. SNow, THE Two CULTLrES AND TmE Sc EnFIc REVOLUTION
(1959).
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the "authority" is the author (auctor), the originator of something.14 5
The development of humanistic learning resembles a perpetual "quer-
elle des anciens et des modernes,"146 a "Great Conversation"1 47 across
the ages. The source and subject of this dialogue is the ancient learning
embodied in classical texts.' 48 Understanding these works, and com-
prehending their significance for modern times, are the traditional goals
of education in the humanities.' 49
The distinction between primary sources and secondary sources is
accordingly basic to scholarly work in the humanities. 50 That which is
authoritative is original, unique, and complete unto itself; all else is sec-
ondary and derivative. In the European Middle Ages the development
of commentaries or glosses on primary sources became particularly
marked, when such great thinkers as Averroes and Thomas Aquinas
devoted the greater part of their lives to the works of Aristotle. 5' The
"rediscovery" of Aristotle's works, some of which had lain in desuetude
145. See I OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 571-72 (1970); E.D. WATr, AUTHORIrT 11-17
(1982) ("Auctoritas and Authority"); A.J. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP 10-12
(1984) ("The Terms Auctor and Auctoritas").
146. See H.R. JAUSS, LITERATURGESCHIC-rE ALS PROVOKATION 11-66 (1974); cf H.
RIGAULT, HISTOIRE DE LA QUERELLE DES ANCIENS ET DES MODERNES (1856); H. GILLOT, LA QUER-
ELLE DES ANCIENS ET DES MODERNES EN FRANCE (1914).
147. See generally R. HUTCHINS, GREAT BOOKS (1954).
148. See id. at 26-27:
The tradition of the West is embodied in the Great Conversation that began in the
dawn of history and that continues to the present day. Whatever the merits of other
civilizations in other respects, no civilization is like that of the West in this respect. No
other civilization can claim that its defining characteristic is a dialogue of this sort. No
dialogue in any other civilization can compare with that of the West in the number of
great works of the mind that have contributed to this dialogue.... [T]o the extent to
which books can present the idea of a civilization, the idea of Western civilization is
presented in great books.
These books are the means of understanding our society and ourselves. They con-
tain the great ideas that dominate us without our knowing it. There is no comparable
repository of our tradition.
149. See id. at 3-14; Arnold, The Function of Criticism at the Present Time, in ESSAYS IN
CRITICISM: FIRST SERIES 8 (T. Hoctor ed. 1968); R. WELLEK & A. WARREN, THEORY OF LITERATURE
3-45 (1949).
150. See, e.g., R. HUTCHINS, supra note 147, at 20-21:
For the understanding of great books it is not necessary to read background mate-
rials or secondary works about them. But there is one sense in which the reading of a
great book may involve prerequisite reading. Except for Homer, the authors of great
books who come later in the course of the Great Conversation enter into it themselves as
a result of reading the earlier authors. Thus, Plato is a reader of the Homeric poems and
of the tragedies and comedies; and Aristotle is a reader of all of these and Plato, too.
Dante and Montaigne are readers of Greek and Roman books, not only the poetry and
history, but the science and philosophy as well. John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, William
James, and Sigmund Freud are readers of almost all the great books...'. mhe voices in
the Great Conversation tend more and more to speak in the present tense, as if all the
authors were contemporaneous with one another, responding directly to each other's
thought.
151. See A. WHEELIS, THE END OF THE MODERN AGE 10 (1971):
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and others of which had actually been lost for centuries, was probably
the primary and precipitating cause of the great revival of learning and
scholarship in the European Middle Ages. 152
In terms of methodology, the humanities may be said to be "de-
scriptive." They are inner-directed. The commentators and glossateurs
seek to probe and plumb the depths of an original source or text and,
sometimes, to "draw out" its relevance for modem times. In doing so,
however, there is no need to go beyond the original text. 153 The critic
remains firmly within the orbit of the original, which provides a full and
sufficient framework for scholarly and intellectual effort. The text is a
satisfying and self-complete world of meanings. 154 "The critic is taught
to think of himself as a transmitter of the best that had been thought
and said by others, and his greatest fear is that he will stand charged of
having substituted his own meanings for the meanings of which he is
supposedly the guardian.... "55
The medieval world is closed.... There is no infinity of learning: the final truth on
every subject has already been written-by Aristotle for the natural world, by Plato for
philosophy, by Euclid for mathematics, by Holy Writ for religion and cosmology.
Within such a closed and finite universe, reason is not a revolutionary ferment, but rather
interior decoration to an intellectual structure already finished.
Of course, ours is no longer the medieval world, and it is no longer closed (at least not in the same
way). See generally A. KoYR, FROM THE CLOSED WORLD TO THE INFINITE UNIVERSE (1957); E.
BURTT, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE (2d ed. 1932). As the
previous quotation from Hutchins emphasizes, the list of original texts and primary sources gradu-
ally lengthens. But that does not diminish in importance the distinction between primary and
secondary sources. If anything, the proliferation of the latter only sharpens the distinction.
152. See R. McKeon, The Philosophy of Aristotle I (unpublished manuscript) (on file at
Regenstein Library, University of Chicago). See generally R. SHUTE, ON THE HISTORY OF THE
PROCESS BY WHICH THE ARISTOTELIAN WRITINGS ARRIVED AT THEIR PRESENT FORM (1888); P.
MANDONNET, SIGER DE BRABANT ET L'AVERROISME LATIN AU XIIIE SItCLE (2d ed. 1911); A. PREM-
INGER, O.B. HARDISON & K. KERRANE, CLASSICAL AND MEDIEVAL LITERARY CRITICISM 263-98,
341-48 (1974); see also W. JAEGER, ARISTOTLE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE HISTORY OF HIS DEVELOP-
ENT (2d ed. 1967).
153. See, e.g., S. BOOTH, AN ESSAY ON SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS ix-x (1969) ("I do not
intentionally give any interpretations of the sonnets I discuss. I mean to describe them, not to
explain them.").
154. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 35055 (1980) (explicating and criticizing
these assumptions).
155. Id. at 355; cf Arnold, supra note 149, at 8, 17, 18:
'Of the literature of France and Germany, as of the intellect of Europe in general,
the main effort, for now many years, has been a critical effort; the endeavour, in all
branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the object as in
itself it really is.'... [Criticism] obeys an instinct prompting it to try to know the best that
is known and thought in the world, irrespectively of practice, politics, and everything of
the kind; and to value knowledge and thought as they approach this best, without the
intrusion of any other considerations whatever.... Its business is, as I have said, simply
to know the best that is known and thought in the world, and by in its turn making this
known, to create a current of true and fresh ideas.
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The traditional humanistic method is the explication de texte.1 56
Erich Auerbach provides a classic example of this in his book Mime-
sis,'" each chapter of which begins with and is spun out of a passage
from a classical author. For the humanist, the text has an almost inex-
haustible depth of meaning. "' Its messages may, as with Plato, be both
esoteric and exoteric. With sacred or religious scripture, in particular, a
certain reverence for the original text may almost be taken for granted.
The authority of scripture is such that even the act of translating it into
a modern language may be so traumatic as to suggest an unacceptable
departure from true doctrine. 159
So firmly has textual thinking dominated humanistic learning that
contemporary theoretical work in the humanities even tends to take the
text as its basic organizing principle. Some of the main thinkers who
might be cited in this connection are Gadamer,160 Ricoeur,16 1 Der-
rida 162 ("Monsieur Texte"'' 63 ), Foucault,16 ' Lacan, 165 and Eco. 16 6
Each of them has, in his own way, constructed a whole view of the
156. Given this dominance and primacy of the original text, the idea of originality in
humanistic scholarship becomes problematic at best. The only course left open to a truly creative
and original thinker may be to rebel against tradition and willfully "misread" an otherwise over-
powering predecessor. See H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973); H. BLOOM, A MAP OF
MISRADINO (1975). Even so, the original remains the point of departure; the rebellious misreading
still takes place within its shadow.
157. E. AUERBACH, MimESis (5th Auflage 1971); cf. J. VINING, supra note 33, at 28-29:
The study and discussion of texts occupies the minds and talk of historians, critics,
and philosophers. Over and over again their method is to take a passage of Aristotle or
Wittgenstein, Marx, Marvell or Faulkner, and ask, What does this mean? How does it fit,
within this writer's work and the work of others? Does it hang together, with internal
coherence and consistency? Do inconsistencies have a purpose and a justification that we
can see? What was his method in producing his text? This is precisely what lawyers (and
judges) do with the opinions of judges or the writings of prominent commentators.
(emphasis in original).
158. See P.D. JUHL, INTERPRETATION 224-30 (1980); P. JONES, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
NOVEL 181-94 (1975).
159. See H.G. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 153-55 (1975); Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1984); T. Grey, Supplementing the Constitution 8.1-8.5 (May
21, 1984) (unpublished manuscript); cf. M. Perry, The Constitution, Adjudication, and Interpreta-
tion: Towards a Deliberative, Transformative Politics 39-62 (unpublished manuscript); see gener-
ally C.H. DODD, THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE (1952); J.K.S. REID, THE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE
(1962); D. KELSEY, THE USES OF SCRIPTURE IN RECENT THEOLOGY (1975).
160. See H.G. GADAMER, supra note 159 (developing a systematic, humanistic, "philo-
sophical hermeneutics" or general theory of interpretation).
161. See P. RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY (1970) (dream as text).
162. See J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158-59 (1976) ("There is nothing outside of the
text .... (emphasis omitted)).
163. See G. HARTMAN, SAVING THE TEXT ch. 1 (1981).
164. See M. FOUCAULT, Tm ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE pt. IV (1972) ("Archaeologi-
cal Description").
165. See Lacan, The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious, in STRUCTURALISM 101 (J.
Ehrmann ed. 1970) (the structure of the unconscious is linguistic).
166. See Eco, Social Life as a Sign System, in STRUCTURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 57 (D.
Robey ed. 1979).
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world out of texts, "text analogues," and the theory of their
interpretation.
In law, Christopher Columbus Langdell was one of the first to at-
tempt to place his subject (or at least its pedagogy) on a modem scien-
tific footing.16 But an examination of Langdell's pronouncements
reveals that he draws from the sciences mainly in matters of methodol-
ogy: 1) His science will be observational and classificatory, like botany
or geology; 168 and 2) his science will be conceptual and analytical, like
logic or geometry. 169 For his concept of legal authority, however,
Langdell draws on the humanistic tradition, and in this regard his ap-
proach is truly revolutionary. 170 He explains his assumptions in a com-
memorative address as follows:
... [I]t was indispensable to establish at least two things:
first, that law is a science; secondly, that all the available mate-
rials of that science are contained in printed books ...
[P]rinted books are the ultimate sources of all legal knowl-
edge;.., every student who would obtain any mastery of law
as a science must resort to these ultimate sources; and ... the
only assistance which it is possible for the learner to receive is
such as can be afforded by teachers who have travelled the
same road before him. ...
167.- See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); R. STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA. FROM THE 1850's TO THE 1950's, at 35, 52-55 (1983).
168. See White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
213, 225-30 (1978); P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUrION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980); Elliott, The Evolu-
tionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 38 (1985).
169. See Grey, supra note 167, at 16-20; Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from
Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986).
170. Cf White, supra note 168, at 220-22 ("Langdell believed in an unfiltered exposure of
law students to original source materials, which he defined as appellate judicial opinions."); id. at
222-23 (canvassing opinions that Langdell's approach was not scientific in the usual sense); id. at
215 n.15 (pondering whether post-Civil War developments in higher education may be character-
ized as "revolutionary").
17 1. A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORTION... ON THE Two HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANxi-
VERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 84, 85-86 (1887). Langdell goes on to say that
"[a]ccordingly, the Law Library has been the object of our greatest and most constant solicitude."
Id. at 86. It is to the lawyer "all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and
physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the zo6logists, all that the botanical garden
is to the botanists." Id. at 86-87. Langdell states further that "a good academic training, especially
in the study of language, is a necessary qualification for the successful study of law." Id. at 87; see
also C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi-vii (1871):
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines .... Each
of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a
growth, extending in many cases through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the
main through a series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of
mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.... It
seemed to me, therefore, to be possible to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for
example, and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and
arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth, devel-
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Here Langdell freely indulges the humanist's assumption that knowl-
edge is derived chiefly through the careful study and analysis of original
texts and primary sources. For lawyers, this means the actual reported
cases, as opposed to the textbooks, treatises, and hornbooks that had
mainly been relied on up to Langdell's time. 172
Similarly, in Wambaugh's work, the original authorities are the
statutes and the reported cases; textbooks and digests are secondary
authorities. 17 1 "The books from which the unwritten [case] law is
opment, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines; and that such a work could not
fail to be of material service to all who desire to study that branch of law systematically
and in its original sources.
Cf. Keener, Methods of Legal Education, I YALE L.J. 143, 144-45 (1892):
mhe student should not only be encouraged to investigate the law in its original sources,
but should be distinctly discouraged from regarding as law, what is, in fact, simply the
conclusions of writers whose opinions are based upon the material to which the student
can be given access.
The case system then proceeds on the theory that law is a science and, as a science,
should be studied in the original sources, and that the original sources are the adjudged
cases and not the opinions of text writers, based upon the adjudged cases.... mhe cases
[are] to [the student] what the specimen is to the mineralogist .... mhe opinion of the
court giving the reasons for the conclusion reached, is really the only authoritative trea-
tise which we have in our law.
Cf. J. REDLICH, Essential Reason for the Success of the Case Method, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE
CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 35, 37 (1914) ("The whole law lies in the
reports of single cases which have been accumulating for centuries.").
172. See Levinson, Law as Literature: Do Legal Texts have Authoritative Interpretations?,
in THE AUTHORITY OF ExPERTs 242, 242-43 (T. Haskell ed. 1984):
Langdell's argument was twofold; his conceptualization of law as a science was
only the first. The other was his assertion that "all of the available materials of that
science are contained in printed books." Both of these principles are crucial to his ap-
proach to law. For Langdell law was essentially a literary enterprise, a science of ex-
tracting meaning from words that would enable one to believe in law as a process of
submission to the commands of authoritative texts (the rule of law) rather than as the
creation of willful interpreters (with submission concomitantly producing the rule of
men).
To an extent never sufficiently acknowledged by his many detractors, Langdell
was altogether correct in linking the legitimacy of the law to the mastery of texts, whether
of cases, statutes, or the Constitution. However much legal positivism justifiably empha-.
sizes the origins of law in social facts, the ordinary language of all developed legal sys-
tems includes constant recourse to texts that authorize specific conduct. One does not
have to accept the entire Langdellian system (indeed, I most certainly do not) in order to
recognize the centrality of textuality to the lawyer's enterprise.
(footnotes omitted); cf. J. WHITE, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS
ON THE RHErORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 107, 110 (1985):
The original idea of the case method.., was simplemindedly scientific: cases were studied
as if they were plants or butterflies in order to discover the laws of regularity by which
they could be classified; those regularities in turn constituted "the law." By the time I was
in law school the emphasis had shifted. Now cases were seen as problems, as pieces of
law-life, to be taken apart and put together, to be imaginatively participated in.... Law
school is thus a kind of language school, working by total immersion, that uses the
"case" as its archetypal occasion for speech, and the judicial opinion deciding the case as
its archetypal form.
173. STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 73.
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learned are the reports, as primary sources, and the digests and text-
books, as secondary sources." 174 Scholarly, humanistic rigor is defined
by the use of primary, original sources and the disdain for secondary,
second-hand accounts.
As a corollary, legal scholarship is authoritative to the extent that
it defers to an original and is not itself original. Goodhart, for example,
warns sternly that "a statement, unsupported by citations, is only of
doubtful value, however distinguished the writer may be."' 75 In the
same vein, Jeremiah Smith even asserts that "[t]he convincing force, if
any such there be, of this article will consist in its want of original-
ity."1 76 It has indeed become something of a rule in legal scholarship
that something can be asserted with authority only if it has already been
asserted by someone else. 1 7 7 This cult of the original extends to case
law too, of course; examples of cases containing well over 300 citations
have been found. 171 Saying something "with authority" means saying
it, literally, "with authorities."' 79 And what authority do the authori-
174. Id. at 81.
175. Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173, 176 (1930).
For an illuminating exception to this rule, see R. GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORmER
112 (1985). Glennon reports on correspondence between Justice Felix Frankfurter and Judge Je-
rome Frank. Justice Frankfurter had written Frank as follows:
We have a right to expect, and are badly in need of, such illumination and discrim-
inating discussion from Courts of Appeals and, more particularly from a judge like you.
After all, while you are what the Constitution calls "an inferior court" and therefore
must duly respect the superior, your brain is yours and is to be exercised.
In his reply, Frank asked whether it would be improper to insert, in an opinion he had been
working on, the following sentences:
We are an inferior court. Yet we have received intimations that the Supreme Court does
not resent, but welcomes opinions from its inferiors on subjects as to which it, as the
superior, has not given fairly unequivocal commands.
Justice Frankfurter responded With the somewhat novel suggestion that Frank simply make such a
statement on his own authority, so to speak:
You have not received any such "intimations" because I'm not empowered to give any
for the Court. What I wrote you was not an "intimation" but my own strong, explicit
conception of the duty, not merely the permissible scope, but the duty of lower court
judges, where the U.S.S.C. has not spoken clearly. Why not express this view, if it is also
yours, in your own way for your authority.
176. Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence, 9 H~Av. L. REy. 13, 14 (1895).
177. My authority for this proposition is, in turn, the fact that it has frequently been
asserted by others.
178. See Davis, The Case for the Case Lawyer, 3 MAss. L.Q. 99, 108 (1916).
179. This phenomenon could be explored on many levels, beginning with, for example,
notions of authority in primitive society. See, e.g., C. LUvi-STRAuss, THE SAVAGE MIND 236 (1973):
[The obstinate fidelity to a past conceived as a timeless model... expresses a consciously
or unconsciously adopted attitude, the systematic nature of which is attested all over the
world by that endlessly repeated justification of every technique, rule, and custom in the
single argument: the ancestors taught it to us.... [A]ntiquity and continuance are the
foundations of legitimacy.
Cf. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 130 (1920) ("Much of the old law which has descended to us was
preserved merely because it was old. Those who practiced and obeyed it... offered no account of it
except that it had come down to them from their ancestors."). For a discussion of parallel tenden-
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ties have? To avoid an infinite regress, English jurists postulate an
originating custom that has existed since time immemorial. 'I Thus, in
law, the one truly authoritative source may, oddly enough, be the one
whose origins we can no longer recall.81 The upshot of this traditional
view of judicial precedents is that emphasis will be placed on the nar-
rowness and "textuality" of legal authority. The broad, generalizing
tendencies of empirical science' 82 will be suppressed.'
cies in Roman history, see Arendt, What Was Authority?, in I NOMOS: AuT-oRnrv 81, 101-02 (C.
Friedrich ed. 1958):
[J]ust as "all auspices were traced back to the great sign by which the gods gave Romulus
the authority to found the city," so all authority derives from this foundation, binding
every act back to the sacred beginning of Roman history, adding, as it were, to every
single moment the whole weight of the past.
Thus, precedents, the deeds of the ancestors and the usage that grew out of them,
are always binding. Anything that has happened is transformed into an example, and the
auctoritas maiorum is identical with authoritative models for actual behavior, is the
moral political standard as such....
It is in this primarily political context that the past was sanctified through tradi-
tion. Tradition preserved the past by handing down from one generation to the next the
testimony of the ancestors, who first had witnessed and created the sacred founding and
then augmented it by their authority throughout the centuries. As long as this tradition
was uninterrupted, authority was inviolate; and to act without authority and tradition,
without accepted, time-honored standards and models, without the help of the wisdom
of the founding fathers, was inconceivable.
(footnotes omitted). This pattern of thought is typical of the European Middle Ages as well:
[The] mistaken attribution of a "modern" work to an "ancient" and distinguished
writer is symptomatic of medieval veneration of the past in general. Old books were the
sources of new learning, as Chaucer remarks .... To be old was to be good; the best
writers were the more ancient. The converse often seems to have been true: if a work was
good, its medieval readers were disposed to think that it was old.
A.J. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL THEORY OF AuTHORSHIP 9 (1984). Cf. Merryman, The Authority of Author-
ity: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN L. REv. 613 (1954); Merryman,
Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. RE. 381 (1977).
180. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmES 63-64, *67-68; C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE
MAKING 123-25 (5th ed. 1951); R. CRoss, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 160 (1979).
Judicial precedents running back to remote antiquity are sometimes presumed to have
originated in a statute that has perished through lapse of time. But see Rantoul, Oration at Scitu-
ate, in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 222, 226 (P. Miller ed. 1969) ("Unparalleled presumption
this!").
181. The similarity to the concept of a mythical Urzeit in primitive thought is too striking
to go unremarked. See generally M. ELIADE, THE MYTH OF nm ETERNAL RETURN (1971).
182. See infra Section IV(C).
183. Holmes had already drawn this connection in commenting on the pedagogical impli-
cations of the Langdellian case method:
We will not be contented to send forth students with nothing but a ragbag full of
general principles,-a throng of glittering generalities like a swarm of little bodiless cher-
ubs fluttering at the top of one of Correggio's pictures.... To make a general principle
worth anything you must give it a body; you must show in what way and how far it
would be applied actually in an actual system....
In pursuance of these views there have been substituted for text-books more and
more, so far as practicable, those books of cases which were received at first by many
with a somewhat contemptuous smile and pitying contrast of the good old days, but
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The humanist intellectual tradition and its "descriptive" method
lead naturally to the view of judicial opinions as direct and authorita-
tive sources of legal rules. The "texts" of judicial opinions thus come to
be treated like statutes, constitutions, and other legal texts.' 84 The lan-
guage used in judicial opinions is studied and analyzed in much the
which now, after fifteen years, bid fair to revolutionize the teaching both of this country
and of England.
A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION... ON THE Two HUNDRED AND FIFnETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 65, 72-73 (1887). See also White, supra note 168, at 225 ("skepti-
cism about abstract propositions was soon complemented by a belief that law students should
immerse themselves in original sources without prior reliance on the generalizations of scholars");
cf J. REDLICH, supra note 171, at 35, 36-37:
In this stage law appears, not as a system of norms and general principles, of abstract
commands and prohibitions, which the state as the highest power sets up by direct ordi-
nance as the general rule of life, and which is laid upon the people, as it were, from the
outside; on the contrary, the law appears here in its original form as the rules of law
found by the judges in every single case that has come up for decision.... The whole law
lies in the reports of single cases which have been accumulating for centuries.
184. Here an important objection must be met. According to the theory of the common
law, there is and must always be an important distinction, in concept and in treatment, between
constitutions, statutes, regulations, and other true legal "texts," whose language is authoritative
and canonical, and judicial opinions, whose language is not. See T. Grey, supra note 159, at 6.11:
Common law tradition treats statutes and judicial decisions differently in this re-
spect. In determining the precedential force of a judicial decision, the judgment is central
and its words are canonical; the opinion is explanatory (like a legislative preamble or
committee report), and is meant as an aid to the interpretation of the judgment-part of
its context, though typically the most important part. The words of a statute, like the
words of a [will] or a deed, are canonical; in this respect the Constitution is like a statute.
Cf E. WAMBAUGH, STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 24 ("The very Words of the Court [are] not
the Doctrine of the Case."); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1, 8 (1941) ("It
cannot be insisted upon too often that our common-law technique does not make the language [of
judicial opinions] authoritative, much less of binding authority. It is the result that passes into the
law."); E. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1951) ("Where case law is considered,
and there is no statute, [the judge] is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the
prior judge even in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum."); 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSItVE LAW 628, 630 (5th ed. 1885):
Since a statute law is expressed in determinate expressions, and those expressions
were intended to convey the will of the legislator, it follows that the import or meaning
which he annexed to those very expressions is the object of genuine interpretation....
But in the analogous process of induction, by which a rule of law is extracted from
judicial decisions, that scrupulous attention to the language used by the legislating judge
would commonly defeat the end for which the process is performed. As the general prop-
ositions which the decision contains are not commonly expressed with much premedita-
tion, and as they must be taken in connection with all the peculiarities of the case, it
follows that the very terms in which those propositions are clothed are not the main
index to the ratio decidendi;-to the general rule or principle which that decision estab-
lished, and which is the governing principle of the case awaiting solution.
(emphasis in original).
I am arguing that much of the authority of judicial doctrine can be explained only by noting
that the language of judicial opinions is being treated precisely as if it were formulaic or canonical,
like the language of a statute or constitution. In Austin's terms, "that scrupulous attention to the
language used" is now being bestowed, for better or for worse, upon judicial opinions. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 340, 107 S. Ct. 2002, 2016
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("mhe Court, having already sanctioned a point of departure that is
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same way that one would puzzle and agonize over the precise wording
of a statute, a constitution, or a literary work.1 85 The language of the
opinion takes on canonical or formulaic status. It begins to command
authority in its own right, rather than merely as a report on how the
decision was reached. Ultimately, the opinion is viewed as itself an orig-
inal text or primary source.
Once this perspective takes root, it alters one's whole approach to
judicial doctrine. Questions of authorial intent and what might be
termed "judicial history" (as a parallel to legislative history) begin to
loom large. For the judge, an existing opinion that stands in the way of
a desired result in a pending case must be taken seriously and grappled
with on the intellectual level. Its wording is not merely one among many
versions of the law; it is the law, expressis verbis. The letter of the law,
and not merely its spirit, resides in the authoritative language of the
opinion.
Manifestations of this development can be seen in every quarter.
In Great Western Railway v. Owners of S.S. Mostyn,"' 6 for example,
the House of Lords could have disposed of the matter before it in rela-
tively straightforward fashion, had it not been for inconvenient lan-
guage in a nineteenth-century case on point, Wear v. Adamson.'" 7 As it
was, the Lords felt compelled to devote almost fifty pages to a close
analysis of the language in Wear. Such solicitude would be incompre-
hensible if the judges' task were merely to establish the facts of the prec-
edential case and the decision reached on those facts.
In this country, particularly in the United States Supreme Court,
the textualist approach to judicial doctrine has become especially
marked. Professor Robert Nagel has convincingly and exhaustively
documented the transformation of the Supreme Court into a great
genuinely not to be found within the language of the statute, finds itself cut off from that authorita-
tive source of the law, and ends up construing not the statute but its own construction.").
185. See, e.g.. Symposium on Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. Ry. 373 (1982); Interpreta-
tion Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985); J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973) ("a sus-
tained attempt to define the life of the law as a literary one"); J. WHITE, supra note 172, at 108:
In my own experience at least, the same central method was at work in both legal
and literary education, for both to a remarkable degree proceeded by drawing the stu-
dent's attention to a series of discrete texts, one after another, and holding it there. In law
the text was typically the judicial opinion; in literary studies usually, though not always,
the poem. In both fields the emphasis was on the text as a self-justifying, self-explaining,
self-authenticating object. The primary method of analysis was to focus on the text's
language and form, rather than, for example, on its social or economic or other context.
Cf. id. at 110 (explaining "this remarkable emphasis on the judicial opinion").
186. [1928] App. Cas. 57.
187. 2 App. Cas. 743 (1877).
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common law court of general jurisdiction, interpreting a "formulaic
Constitution" that exists only in the opinions of the Court."' 8
During roughly the last thirty years a new style of opin-
ion writing has emerged as the most common method of con-
stitutional exegesis. This style emphasizes formalized doctrine
expressed in elaborately layered sets of "tests" or "prongs" or
''requirements" or "standards" or "hurdles." The judicial
opinions in which these "analytical devices" appear tend to be
characterized by tireless, detailed debate among the Justices.
The apparently definitive formulations, standing amidst a
welter of separate opinions and contentious footnotes, seem
forlorn testaments to the ideals of clarity and consensus. But,
taken together, the formulae and the extensive explanation
comprise a consistent pattern of earnest argumentation. l 8 9
Presumably, a bedrock layer of constitutional text lies beneath the for-
mulae, but that original source has become encrusted by so many layers
of judicial doctrine that the real debates are now taking place only at
the periphery. '90 Nagel argues that constitutional doctrine has become
188. See Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 165 (1985); cf id. at 166-68
& nn.3-18 (describing the formulae used in explicating freedom of speech, separation of church
and state, state sovereignty, equal protection, substantive and procedural due process, the case and
controversy requirement, the commerce power, the contract clause, the privileges and immunities
clause, the right against self-incrimination, the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the right to
effective counsel, the right to conduct one's own defense, and the fourth amendment cases defining
"reasonable" and "searches").
189. Id. at 165 (footnotes omitted); cf. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship in the United States: An
Overview, 50 MOD. L. Rv. 804, 810 (1987) ("The canonical statement of what due process re-
quires ... is almost a parody of the balancing approach."); Grey, supra note 167, at 52 n.183
(comparing the U.S. Supreme Court's "levels of scrutiny" in equal protection analysis with the
California Supreme Court's negligence formula).
190. See Jones, Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L. REa. 11, 12-14
(1983):
The tests brought to bear in determining the validity or invalidity of challenged
governmental action are ... formulated in terms that paraphrase or refine the simpler
and usually more general words of the Constitution itself.
... The constitutional text is down there somewhere under this massive overlay of
case law development and refinement, but the usual contest between advocates in the
Supreme Court, and more often than not between or among the Justices, is the kind of
contest that has characterized the common law judicial process at least since the days of
Sir Edward Coke, a battle ovei cases and what they should be taken to stand for.
... The literal text of the Constitution. .. figures in contemporary constitutional
adjudication only at one remove, that is, as the words of the original text have been
construed, expounded, and developed by successive generations of Supreme Court
Justices.
In the two centuries of our life as a constitutional republic, a vast and intricate
exegesis has been imposed on the lean text of the original constitutional document....
mhe student or practitioner of constitutional law, or the constitutional judge, is working
not just with a text but with an authoritative literature, authoritative because the doc-
trine of precedent makes it so.
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the authoritative, canonical "text" that the Constitution once was.
"[Jludicial construction comes to be interchangeable with the original
text. Interpretation can then stand in place of the original text....
When doctrine becomes an end in itself, either some perfected formula
must stand in place of external authority or that authority must be
nullified."' 91
When judicial doctrine comes to serve as an authoritative text, the
canons of construction appropriate to it become correspondingly nar-
row, restrictive, and deferential. "Deductions thus formed, and estab-
lished in the adjudication of particular causes, become, in a manner,
part of the text of the law. Succeeding judges receive them as such, and,
in general, consider themselves as bound to adhere to them no less
strictly than to the express dictates of the legislature."' 92 In this situa-
tion the goal of interpretation is simply to describe an original text,
illuminate its inner meaning, and essentially defer to its authority. It
may be, as Cardozo suggests, that the word starts out to free thought
but ends by enslaving it.'93 If so, jurists and legal scholars can never-
theless understand why they have been reduced to commentators and
glossateurs, with correspondingly restrictive and deferential notions of
dictum, stare decisis, and the ratio decidendi. It is because they are en-
gaged in the essentially humanist enterprise of interpreting an authori-
tative, canonical text.'
94
191. Nagel, supra note 188, at 184, 190. For similar views, see Monaghan, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 770-72 (1988) (in constitutional adjudica-
tion "the absolute primacy of text over gloss" cannot be maintained; "the case law overwhelms the
text and historical understanding"; and "the Supreme Court is concerned not with the Constitu-
tion, but with constitutional law, which consists largely (albeit not entirely) of case law"); Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 234 (1980) (contem-
porary constitutional doctrine relies increasingly on "the elaboration of the Court's own prece-
dents"); Weisberg, Deregulating Death. 1983 Sup. CT. Rev. 305, 313 (the Court is "engaged in a
debate over the meaning of its own pronouncements"); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minori-
ties, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1193 (1977) ("ITihe evolving content of constitutional law is not
controlled, nor even significantly guided, by the Constitution, understood as an historical docu-
ment."); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Inter-
pretation," 58 S. CAL. L. Rev. 551 (1985).
This Article does not attempt to provide an adequate account of precedent in constitutional
law. For discussions of that subject, see Monaghan, supra; P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEciSIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1118-29 (1975).
192. 1 Douglas's Reports iv (1807) (emphasis added); cf Note, 9 LAW Q. REv. 106(1893)
("The moment that a principle is enunciated in the form of a parliamentary enactment it is apt to
become in the minds of English judges not the statement of a principle but a verbal rule, the
meaning whereof is to be determined by rather narrow canons of interpretation.").
193. See Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
194. This account of the humanistic tradition of interpretation should be supplemented
by a discussion of the impact of skepticism and ethical relativism on modern views. The debate
over original intent, for example, is in part a debate among humanists and not simply between
humanists and social scientists. As I have suggested, the way one goes about reading a text makes
all the difference. But it is also important to observe that the humanists do not always agree on
how to proceed. See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. Rev.
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C. The Experiment
The law of judicial precedents shares an ambiguous and ambiva-
lent heritage with the intellectual tradition of the sciences, as well as
that of the humanities. In the sciences, the experiment may be said to
provide a source or paradigm of authority comparable to the authorita-
tive text in the humanities. This section traces out the contrasting con-
ception of legal authority that has been developed on the model of em-
pirical science.
An experiment may be viewed as a question posed, under carefully
controlled conditions, to nature.195 The experimental conditions are
like the facts of a legal case, and nature's answer, properly understood,
may (the scientist hopes) be formulated as a law. Likewise in legal anal-
ysis, the point of studying varied fact patterns and their adjudicated
results is to extract "the law" from them.' 9 6 The results of an experi-
ment serve, both in law and in science, as a decisive, empirical test of
some more general doctrine or principle.
A single research project, however, has no significance or value in
science. Nothing special attaches to the unique particulars of time,
place, and personages involved in an experiment, however momentous
it may have been in the history of science. The experiment has value and
significance only if it can, in principle and in fact, be repeated-with the
same results-at other times, by other scientists, in other places. Experi-
mental results that cannot be so replicated are initially greeted with
skepticism or suspicion. If the inability to replicate them persists, they
are discarded as worthless.
The scientific experiment derives authority not from its status as an
"original," but from the repeated confirmation of its results by other,
later experimenters. The difference is fundamental. The text is whole,
complete, and self-sufficient; the experiment is radically incomplete-it
needs "context" in order to be meaningful. Later scientific experiment-
885 (1985). Charles Beard, a humanist, never accepted the idea that the Constitution was the final
and only authority as to what constituted government and protected individual rights. See C.
BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (A. Westin ed. 1962); see also R. HOF-
STADTER, TE PROGR.ESSivE HISTORIANS: TURNER, BEARD, PARRINGTON (1968). Some would argue
that Beard was a social scientist, and he was doubtless influenced by that rising body of knowledge,
but this argument simply raises the definitional problem again. By our standards, Beard is not
much of a scientist, but by those of his time he was, just as Langdell was widely considered (and
considered himself) to be establishing a "scientific" approach to law. Another way of looking at
these matters is suggested by P. BOBBTT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982), though Bobbitt gives history (and humanistic inquiry generally) low marks.
195. See A. KOYRIt, METAPHYSICS AND MEASUREMENT 12-15 & n. 1 (1968) ("Experiment-
in contradistinction to mere experience---is a question we put to Nature."); id. at 18-19 ("Experi-
mentation is the methodical interrogation of nature.").
196. For a discussion of the senses in which scientific experiments may be conducted in
law, see J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN.LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-81 (1985).
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ers are not trying to redirect attention to an originating event; they are
testing it and challenging its claims to authority. It is the community of
professional scientists, not the individual experimenter, which will fi-
nally be in a position to endow experimental results with true scientific
authority. "Communities of this sort are . . . the producers and
validators of scientific knowledge."' 97 By the time the scientific com-
munity has confirmed an experiment, the results and the underlying
theory they support are accepted as authoritive, not the original experi-
ment itself. Where the humanists continually hearken back to unique,
original sources, the scientists have no use for them. 19
8
Just as a single experiment cannot confirm a theory, it cannot dis-
confirm one either. Thomas Kuhn has drawn attention to the remark-
197. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 178 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter
ScIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS]; cf. id. at 164-70, 200 ("It is the community of specialists rather than its
individual members that makes the effective decision."); see also T. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TEN-
SION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE XX (1977) [hereinafter THE ESSEN-
TIAL TENSION]:
Traditional discussions of scientific method have sought a set of rules that would
permit any individual who followed them to produce sound knowledge. I have tried to
insist, instead, that, though science is practiced by individuals, scientific knowledge is
intrinsically a group product and that neither its peculiar efficacy nor the manner in
which it develops will be understood without reference to the special nature of the groups
that produce it.
(emphasis in original).
In a related context, Stanley Fish has explored "the authority of interpretive communities"
in shaping and defining their discussions, disciplines, and even their primary texts. See generally S.
FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980).
198. The way scientific textbooks are written illuminates this point. Typically, their view
of the history of their discipline is drastically foreshortened and compressed. The original experi-
ments and the often laborious efforts required to work them up into a powerful, comprehensive
theory are of "merely historical" interest. The main point is to present contemporary scientific
theory as the timeless and authoritative centerpiece of study:
[S]cience textbooks... refer only to that part of the work of past scientists that can
easily be viewed as contributions to the statement and solution of the texts' paradigm
problems. Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are
implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in ac-
cordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific
theory and method has made seem scientific.... [The results of scientific research show
no obvious dependence upon the historical context of the inquiry. ... More historical
detail, whether of science's present or of its past, or more responsibility to the historical
details that are presented, could only give artificial status to human idiosyncrasy, error,
and confusion. Why dignify what science's best and most persistent efforts have made it
possible to discard?
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 197, at 138; cf. id. at 165:
Until the very last stages in the education of a scientist, textbooks are systemati-
cally substituted for the creative scientific literature that made them possible .... Why,
after all, should the student of physics, for example, read the works of Newton, Faraday,
Einstein, or Schr6dinger, when everything he needs to know about these works is recapit-
ulated in a far briefer, more precise, and more systematic form in a number of up-to-date
textbooks?
See also R. WOLLHEIM, ART AND 17s OBJECTS 75 (1968) (literary works, unlike scientific explana-
tions, are not "expendable" once they have been understood).
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able extent to which anomalies and counter-instances are tolerated
within all scientific paradigms.199 "[T]here is no such thing as research
without counterinstances ... because no paradigm that provides a basis
for scientific research ever completely resolves all its problems.", 20 0
Some of this evident tolerance for anomalies can doubtless be attrib-
uted to scientists' ability to refine or modify their theories to accommo-
date apparently discrepant results.2 °1 Similarly, legal rules may be
modified in light of decisions that are apparently at variance with an
original precedent. But perhaps a more basic reason for this tolerance
of anomalies is that experimental verification is only one of a number of
important criteria of an authoritative scientific theory.20 2 Kuhn, for
example, suggests the following set of criteria:
First, a theory should be accurate: within its domain,
that is, consequences deducible from a theory should be in
demonstrated agreement with the results of existing experi-
ments and observations. Second, a theory should be consist-
ent, not only internally or with itself, but also with other cur-
rently accepted theories applicable to related aspects of
nature. Third, it should have broad scope: in particular, a the-
ory's consequences should extend far beyond the particular
observations, laws, or subtheories it was initially designed to
explain. Fourth, and closely related, it should be simple,
bringing order to phenomena that in its absence would be in-
dividually isolated and, as a set, confused. Fifth... a theory
should be fruitful of new research findings: it should, that is,
disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships
among those already known. 20 3
Kuhn notes that his first criterion, accuracy, is in some sense the
most decisive, and scientists are particularly unwilling to give it up. 2°4
But a theory that offers only superior accuracy may be at a relative
disadvantage as against one that offers more consistency, scope, sim-
199. See SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 197, at 77-82; THE ESSENTIAL TENSION,
supra note 197, at 266-92, 320-39; cf. M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 18-48 (1958); N. HAN-
SON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY (1958); L. LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS (1977).
200. SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 197, at 79.
201. See id. at 78 ("Counterinstances to a prevalent epistemological theory ... cannot and
will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scien-
tists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc mod-
ifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.").
202. See id. at 147 ("To the historian, at least, it makes little sense to suggest that verifica-
tion is establishing the agreement of fact with theory. All historically significant theories have
agreed with the facts, but only more or less.").
203. THE ESSENTIAL TENSION, supra note 197, at 321-22 (footnote omitted).
204. See id. at 322-23.
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plicity, and fruitfulness.2"' This suggests that accuracy or experimental
verification alone is at most a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of
scientific authority.
Kuhn's third criterion, broad scope, provides an important insight
into scientific method. Whereas the humanities are descriptive or inner-
directed in their methods, the sciences are explanatory or outer-di-
rected. Scientific theories, like single experiments, have no particular
value in and of themselves. They have value only to the extent that they
fit into and extend a more general explanatory framework. A scientific
theory's consequences, says Kuhn, "should extend far beyond the par-
ticular observations, laws, or subtheories it was initially designed to ex-
plain."20 6 That is, we should be able to generalize from it, to apply it in
subsequent encounters with new phenomena, and ultimately to fill in
our picture of the universe with it. A scientific theory whose scope is
strictly limited to the original data from which it was derived is like an
experiment that cannot be replicated or a legal doctrine that is narrowly
confined to the particular facts of an original case. It does not meaning-
fully contribute to the scientific enterprise.20
7
Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker have explored
similar issues in a context lying somewhat closer to law, that of the
social sciences.20 ' Monahan and Walker argue, in effect, that the crite-
ria for authority in the social sciences are the same as those for "prece-
dential persuasiveness" in law.20 9 Social science research is authorita-
tive to the extent that it "(1) has survived the critical review of the
scientific community; (2) has employed valid research methods; (3) is
generalizable to the case at issue; and (4) is supported by a body of
other research.", 210
205. See id. at 323-25.
206. Id. at 322.
207. For an elaboration on the distinction between description and explanation, see C.
Collier, Toward a Philosophy of History chs. 1-2 (1978) (Yale Ph.D. dissertation). The concept of
"generalizability" in law is discussed in more detail below.
208. See Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing
Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986) (hereinafter Social Authority]; Walker &
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. Rav. 559 (1987)
[hereinafter Social Frameworks]; Walker & Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Le-
gal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 877 (1988).
209. Thus, Monahan and Walker "propose that courts treat social science research as
they would legal precedent under the common law." Social Authority, supra note 208, at 488. This
Article argues that one major strand in the judicial treatment of precedents derives from notions of
authority established in the sciences. There thus appears to be substantial agreement that the prin-
ciples and evaluative criteria used by a social scientist in determining the scientific worth of a piece
of research parallel those used by a court in determining the precedential value of a prior decision.
See Social Authority, supra note 208, at 498-99 (noting a "striking similarity"); Social Frameworks,
supra note 208, at 587 ("remarkable resemblance" observed).
210. Social Authority, supra note 208, at 499.
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In the social sciences, critical review is accomplished through peer
review of research proposals by screening panels, the publication of re-
search results in refereed scholarly journals, and subsequent reviews by
other researchers in other journals.211 In law, a similar review process
can be seen in the provisions for appeals to progressively larger panels
of progressively more eminent (and presumably more disinterested) ap-
pellate tribunals. As Wambaugh noted, "A decision of a court not of
last resort is usually not of high persuasive authority." '212
Research methods are said to be well designed or "internally
valid" when they logically rule out, or at least minimize, competing ex-
planations for the observed results.2 13 Scientific theories based on in-
ternally invalid research methods are like poorly reasoned judicial opin-
ions. Again, as Wambaugh pointed out, the precedential authority of
legal opinions rests to a considerable extent on the quality of their
reasoning."'
Monahan and Walker place special emphasis on their third crite-
rion of social science authority, "generalizability" (Kuhn's "broad
scope"). Research findings have generalizability or "external validity"
to the extent that they can be applied beyond the specific facts of the
study to other people, other places, and other times.215 Monahan and
Walker state that the factors involved in social science generalizability
"parallel almost precisely the factors courts commonly consider in as-
certaining the precedential pertinence of prior decisions";"' and in-
deed the notion of generalizability captures much that is central to prec-
edential authority in law:
The principal similarity between social science research
and law is that both are general-both produce principles ap-
plicable beyond particular instances .... Like social science,
law, particularly court decisions in a common-law system, de-
rives from specific empirical events (the facts of a case), but
speaks more broadly. It is this attribute of generality that is
described as the "precedential effect" or authoritative nature
of a court decision. A decision takes on the mantle of legal
authority in subsequent litigation precisely to the extent that
the decision transcends the people, situation, and time present
in the original case.217
211. See id. at 500-01.
212. STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 62.
213. See Social Authority, supra note 208, at 502; cf. id. at 502-05.
214. See supra Section 1.
215. See Social Authority, supra note 208, at 506-07.
216. Id. at 506.
217. Id. at 490-91.
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There are also specific policy reasons to favor broad rules of law.
Legal doctrine has an important heuristic function; it teaches and edu-
cates us as to our legal rights and duties.2 1 The whole point of written
judicial opinions, after all, is to explain legal decisions, not merely to
announce them. 21 9 The diffusion of legal knowledge cannot be accom-
plished where it is difficult or impossible to generalize from past "les-
sons."2 2 We need these cultural repositories of accumulated legal wis-
dom in order to understand the law and to learn from it.2 2 1 Broad,
general rules and principles serve these ends in a way that narrow, fact-
specific decisions cannot.222
Monahan and Walker's final criterion, whether scientific findings
are "supported by a body of other research," has already been dis-
cussed in the context of the scientific experiment. The more often exper-
imental results can be independently confirmed, the less likely it is that
218. See R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 99-101 (3d ed. 1979):
[The function of a court is not only to give judgment, but also to lay down a
principle consistent with that judgment.... [O]ne of the functions of the courts in gen-
eral, and of appellate courts in particular, is to discuss and enunciate general principles as
pointers to the future development of the law.
Cf. E. Burke, Report from the Committee of the House of Commons, Appointed to Inspect
the Lords' Journals in Relation to Their Proceedings on the Trial of William Hastings, in XI THE
WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 1, 41 (S. Pinney ed. 1871) (speech given April 30, 1794):
Your committee do not find any positive law which binds the judges of the courts
in Westminster Hall publicly to give a reasoned opinion from the bench, in support of
their judgment upon matters that are stated before them. But the course hath prevailed
from the oldest times. It hath been so general and so uniform, that it must be considered
as the law of the land.
219. See R. CROSS, supra note 218, at 48 ("In general.., the authority of a decision for
which no reasons are given is very weak."); E. WAMBAUGH, STUDY OF CASES, supra note 7, at 47
("If the reasons for a decision are not given, the decision can be of little weight, for it does not
appear to have been the result of thorough investigation. Clearly, the same result follows if there is
no citation of authorities."); I Douglas's Reports v (1807) ("[tlhe authority of a decision, for
obvious reasons, is held to be next to nothing, if it passes sub silentio, without argument at the bar,
or by the court; and it is impossible from the record ofajudgment to discover whether the case was
solemnly decided or not."); see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT Ti BAR OF POLTICS 23-28 (1962); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 19-20 (1959); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword:
The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 84, 98-99 (1959).
220. See Baldwin, Teaching Law by Cases, 14 HARv. L. REy 258,259 (1900) ("No science
can be learned purely from particulars. The universals must be studied to discover what the partic-
ulars mean and whence they sprang."); cf. Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 208,
at 491 ("Scientific findings are evaluated in part by their heuristic value-by their ability to order
and make understandable new phenomena. Likewise, a court decision comes to be accorded the
status of precedent when it is found to embody a principle that assists in the resolution of a subse-
quent conflict.").
221. See J. WHITE, A Talk to Entering Students, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHET-
ORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 55-56 (1985) ("the judicial opinion... is the last stage of a long and
complicated process[,]... the cultural deposit or artifact left behind by weeks or months or years
of work by actual people in the real world .... ").
222. See Schauer, supra note 121, at 600-01 (generality of precedents depends on "sub-
stantive value choices" and varies with "the purposes to be served within a decisional domain").
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they are due to unrepresentative data or methodological flaws in the
design of the experiment. Similarly, a legal precedent gains in authority
as it is followed and relied on by other courts in subsequent cases. 22 3
Law, like science, builds on its accomplishments as it adds to them; and
a given doctrine finally acquires legal authority only when "the collec-
tive opinion of legal experts" 224 has coalesced around it. As early as
1930, Goodhart had detected in American legal doctrine a peculiar and
unacknowledged affiliation with lajurisprudence in the Continental tra-
dition, which requires a settled course of decisions before precedential
authority can be established. 225 "[I]n modem Continental law the em-
phasis is not on the individual case in particular, but rather on a series
or group of cases creating a practice."-226 If his later pronouncements
are any indication ("further decisions are frequently required before the
scope of a principle is finally determined"), 227 Goodhart may ulti-
mately have come over to that view himself.228
223. "The greater the number of courts that cite and rely upon a decision, the less likely it
is that the decision contains some hidden flaw that, ifdiscovered, would lead to a different result."
Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 208, at 508.
224. F. POLLOCK, The Science of Case-Law, supra note 70, at 179:
The ideal standard is, in fact, nothing else than the objective side of the legal habit of
mind itself, when considered as independent of the particular individuals in whom the
habit is formed. It cannot be found in any one book or in any one lawyer, but only in the
collective opinion of legal experts.
Cf J. BEALE, JURISPRUDENCE LECTURES (1909), reprinted in 29 U. MiAu L. RE'. 281, 293 (1975)
("It is the opinion of those expert in that method of thought, which is the law. How do you tell
what is the law of Massachusetts today? ... The law of Massachusetts is what the body of the
Massachusetts bar thinks it is."); J. BEALE, A TRATISE ON THE CoNR Icr OF LAWS 150 (1916) ("The
law of a given time must be taken to be the body of principles which is accepted by the legal
profession.").
225. See Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173, 173-75,
179-86 (1930) ("in no distant time the American doctrine will approximate that of the civil law");
cf. Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Priijudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REv.
199, 209-11 (1933) (explaining the "process of generalization" that a single precedent initiates, and
comparing the common law judicial opinion to the "doctrine" of Continental jurisprudence); E.
LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-4 (1949) (common law rules are derived from
determinations of similarity and difference among cases over time).
226. A. GOODHART, supra note I, at 10; cf Lambert & Wasserman, The Case Method in
Canada and the Possibilities of its Adaptation to the Civil Law, 39 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1929) ("The
practice of the courts does not become a source of the law until it is definitely fixed by the repetition
of precedents which are in agreement on a single point.").
227. See supra Section Ill(B).
228. As noted previously, see supra note 4, the task of this Article is the "creative
redescription" of legal doctrine and not an evaluative or comparative weighing of the various
doctrines so described. Nevertheless, it may be useful to indicate in broad outline how a critique of
the "scientific" doctrine of precedent might proceed. Fortunately, such a critique has already been
adumbrated in the context of tort law. See White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-
1910, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 250-57 (1978) [hereinafter White, Legal Science]; see also G.E.
WHmTE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 55-62 (1980).
A basic assumption of the scientific doctrine of precedent is that rules of increasing breadth
and generality can be extracted from the varied fact patterns of adjudicated cases. See supra text
accompanying notes 195-96; Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies-An Afterword,
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V. CONCLUSION
A comprehensive doctrine of precedent---complete with its own
policy rationales--can thus be developed on the assumptions of the
natural and social sciences. This doctrine stands in direct opposition to
the traditional view of precedent, derived from humanistic thought,
which restricts legal authority as narrowly as possible to the express
terms of an original text. The model of narrowness cannot be followed
to its logical conclusion because it leads to a particularity and specificity
that can never be of more than individual interest or form the basis of a
useful rule (the ratio decidendi). The model of generalizability is not,
however, entirely satisfactory either, because the regime of case law de-
mands that judicial intrusions into ordinary life be of a strictly limited,
restrained, and modest sort (the dictum principle).
How these two, directly opposed doctrines of precedent could have
coexisted for so long is itself an interesting question.229 Their opposi-
tion is not, in any event, incidental or fortuitous, like an afterthought in
1 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1972) ("the application of scientific methods to the study of the legal sys-
tem" should be encouraged in order "to discover and explain the recurrent patterns in the observa-
tions-the 'laws' of the system"). These broad rules are, however, vulnerable to atomizing tenden-
cies at several levels. How can a set of general principles applicable to all cases be derived from a
quantitatively growing and qualitatively changing body of cases? Langdell's response, that most
of the cases are "useless and worse than useless" for this purpose, is, as White notes, only a "primi-
tive" response. White, Legal Science, supra, at 251. Later efforts were directed at integrating im-
perfect cases and refining existing principles.
Even assuming that a provisional rule can be derived from the cases, how is the rule to be
maintained in the face of varied applications of it by idiosyncratic legal officials (including juries)
in different fact contexts? "The more often a principle of tort law, such as negligence, took its
operative meaning from individualized decisions by discrete juries, the less meaningful that princi-
ple was as a uniform guide to conduct." White, Legal Science, supra, at 252. If substantive rules are
largely subject to modification in the process by which they are implemented, then the better part
of "scientific" valor would be to focus on that modification process itself, not on the rules. This
would be the empirical, inductive approach, since it "proceeded from the diverse facts of cases to
generalizations about the 'judicial process.' " In contrast, the reasoning of the soi-disant scientists
can be seen as "dogmatic reasoning, emphasizing the formulation of meaningless abstract princi-
ples that were asserted to have some universal validity. That assertion... ignored the operation of
the principles in practice." White, Legal Science, supra, at 254.
This suggests the range of criticism to which the scientific paradigm may be subject. For
general discussions in this vein, see E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); D. HOLLINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIEN-
TInIc IDEAL (1975). On the Legal Realists' critique of general, abstract categories and their project
of replacing them with narrow, concrete ones, see Grey, supra note 167, at 49 & n.177.
229. An answer may be sought in the suggestion that "[l]aw is a scavenger. It grows by
feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing new ones of its own. How borrowed ideas-not
political and social theories, but abstract ideas borrowed from other disciplines-affect the law is a
topic scholars have overlooked." Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 38, 38 (1985); cf Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30
AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 95, 96 (1986) ("One might argue that precisely because law does not possess
one unique set of methodological assumptions dictated by its nature and process jurists must seek
for methodological paradigms elsewhere.").
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the history of ideas. Instead, it expresses an essential tension deep at the
heart of the doctrine of precedent, which has always had recourse to
these opposed ways of thinking. Both are inevitable in a system that
aspires simultaneously to scientific validity and judicial restraint, indi-
vidual justice and the protection of settled rights, progress and or-
der.2" 0 Theories of precedential authority are driven between these two
paradigms in something very like a Hegelian dialectic. What makes the
tension and the dialectic "necessary" is that if the rule of a case is either
too broad or too narrow, it loses its force as legal authority. As a result,
legal analysis is pushed outward, by methods patterned on the experi-
mental sciences, to make principles broader and to avoid non-preceden-
tial particularity. In order to avoid creating overly broad dictum, how-
ever, it is drawn back to the text and the humanities tradition.
. The law of judicial precedents is in this sense theoretically unsta-
ble; it rests on shaky conceptual foundations, borrowed from other dis-
ciplines, that only indirectly address legal concerns. But things could
hardly be otherwise for what is, at bottom, a system of pragmatic ac-
commodations that has come into existence largely through historical
happenstance. At this stage, to demand complete logical consistency
and methodological purity from an historical and intellectual edifice
that has to solve the practical problems of real life is neither realistic nor
reasonable. The law is, like Whitman, "large"; it contains multitudes;
and it contradicts itself.231
230. See Schauer, supra note 121, at 595-602; White, Legal Science, supra note 228, at 255.
231. See W. WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in 1 LEAVES OF GRASS: A TEXTUAL VARIORUM OF
rHE PRINr POEMS 1, 82 (S. Bradley ed. 1980):
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)
Cf. O.W. HOLMES, THm COMMON LAW 32 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("The truth is, that the law is always
approaching, and never reaching, consistency."); B. CARDozo, THE PARAwoxEs OF LEGAL SCIENCE
4 (1928) ("The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis of oppo-
sites, these are the great problems of the law.").

